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This essay is a wholly theoretical engagement with the pedagogic relation. It attempts to take a 
small step in the direction of theorising the very complex phenomenon of the pedagogic relation. 
The relation is non-trivial as it is imbued with all the complications of social relations, plus the 
added complexity of the relation of knowledge in the social/libidinal economy of the classroom. 
Pedagogic communication is the quintessential factor at the interactional level of pedagogic praxis 
in the classroom. It is at this level of pedagogy that the essay attempts to interrogate the entailments 
of the relation constituted when teaching takes place. The praxis of teaching revolves around 
'effective' communication in order to transmit the curriculum that is intended to be acquired by the 
student. 
The fIrst chapter of this essay kicks off the discussion by isolating the features of resistance in the 
pedagogic relation which hinder the smooth functioning of pedagogic communication. In order to 
get a fIrmer theoretical grasp on this factor of pedagogy, the argument then turns to Bernstein's 
theory of pedagogic discourse in Chapter 2. Pedagogic communication occupies a central place in 
Bernstein, for it is his view "that the inner structure of the pedagogic is . .. a theory of pedagogic 
communication" (Bernstein 1990: 171, italics in original). The concepts found within Bernstein 
hold out the potential for a theoretically rigorous account of the subtle dynamics of the pedagogic 
relation in terms of pedagogic communication. Amongst other insights, Bernstein's theory guides 
our analysis with the principle that in "any theory which attempts to link pedagogic communication 
with pedagogic consciousness/conscience ... The basic question to be asked is a/ways with 
reference to the privileging pedagogic text (Bernstein 1990: 172, italics in original). However, the 
potential on offer in Bernstein is shown to be underdeveloped within his own writings, particularly 






















shown that Bernstein's texts hint at the potential for alternative theoretical angles to be integrated 
into his theory, particularly that of Jacque Lacan's notion of desire in relation to the acquisition of 
the student's identity. 
We therefore tum, in Chapter 3, to alternative descriptions of the pedagogic relation which derive 
from Bourdieu's (1992) notion of the "symbolic mandate" and Lacan's notion of the ''phallus'' (Aoki 
2002). The appeal to these notions opens up a wider field of discursive potential in terms of which 
to build a description of the pedagogic relation. Chapter 4 is, therefore, devoted to the clarification 
of conceptual tools to propel the analysis in terms of notions borrowed chiefly from Lacan (Miller 
1994; Evans 2006), Laclau & Mouffe (1985), and Greimas' (1989, 1968), but also from Tall & 
Gray's (1994) notion of"procept". 
The relations between Bernstein's initial model of transmission-acquisition are then mapped, via 
Greimas' semiotic square, onto the Lacanian discourses of the social bond in Chapters 5 and 6. In 
doing so, we formulate a model that demonstrates the structural, ontological necessity of an 
objective antagonism which constitutes the pedagogic relation. This mapping is accomplished by 
drawing on the work of Davis (2005a, 2005b, 2004, 2003, 2002). 
The implications of this feature, which functions paradoxically as the identity of the student as well 
as the point of immanent failure of pedagogic communication, are theorised to their logical end at 
which we conclude that the dynamics of the pedagogic relation are structured originally through the 
student's acquisition of identity in the pedagogic discourse of the teacher. The identity, however, is 
simultaneously the potential for educating as well as its obstacle. At the level of the relation of 
knowledge transmitted and knowledge reproduced - that is, at the level of the privileged text - there 






















Hysteric. It is this recursion which imbues the pedagogic relation with its dynamism. 
In this essay I have only scratched the tip of the iceberg by viewing the pedagogic relation from the 
point of view of the teacher's aim of the reproduction of the privileged text. The theory has much 
potential for refinement; but it is my hope that, with this initial contribution, I will be contributing 
to a greater sensitivity of the complexity entailed in the relation between the teacher, the student and 
i 
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!~. 1.1 Introduction; the phenomenon of 'methods', 'strategies' and 'theories ofteachin&' 
This essay is an engagement with a personal struggle, which I will attempt to engage with on a 
purely theoretical basis. The struggle is about the question confronting me each time I prepare a 
lesson - and it may be encapsulated very generally in the question, "What is the best way to teach 
this topic?". A "topic" stands for any segment of a course in a particular subject, or a curriculum 
segment. In my case, this would be a topic in Mathematics or Natural Sciences, both of which I 
teach at secondary level. It is the concern about the 'best way' to teach (a topic) that is pervasive in 
my reflections on my own teaching. Because teaching is not merely the delivery of information to 
an individual or group of people. It is about how best I could facilitate the acquisition of the 
knowledge by those whom I address as students. 
The question then really becomes a matter of interrogating what is entailed in the notion of the 'best' 
way. Inevitably, in the preparation of lessons, the kind of learner that I could potentially address 
comes to mind. I form an hypothesis about the individual as student, and about the group, and this 
hypothesis includes ideas about the learners' previous knowledge, the type of 'talk' which has 
everyday meaning for them, their levels of interest in my subject, and perseverance with difficulties 
in the topic, etc. At the start of a year when all my classes are new, for example, I assume that 
everything with regards to both behavioural discipline and subject content must be made explicit 
and that tests for background knowledge must be done. I try to leave nothing to chance and even 
spell out the way in which I expect the class to interact with me and I with them. 
As the year progresses, and the peculiarities of my pedagogic relationship with the class are 
established as individual characteristics begin to emerge, my assumptions are modified and my 
planning adapts, but my reflections on pedagogy continue and the aim remains the same. The aim is 
always to allow for the smoothest possible learning experience by attempting to pre-empt possible 
barriers or pitfalls to the teaching and learning process. 























or external to the teacher. Examples of barriers and pitfalls include the lack of prerequisite 
knowledge and student self-discipline issues, or the pace of the curriculum, the kind of textbook 
used, my teaching style, etc. My planning thus attempts to accommodate for all that 'barriers and 
pitfalls' might entail and is structured to include content, teaching style, regulations on deportment, 
etc., that will hopefully dissolve the assumed barriers, or fill in and make up for the pitfalls - that 
which is missing - if these problems arise. Stated concisely, in my experience, there appears to be 
always some factor, inherent to the pedagogic relationship, which limits its efficacy for 
transmission-acquisition of knowledge and around which lesson planning is structured. 
These concerns are valid across the spectrum of classrooms: from well-functioning schools all the 
way through to the environment infiltrated with socio-cultural and socio-economic problems. The 
school at which I teach, for example, is a former model-C school, still enjoying the benefits of its 
privileged past and attracting students predominantly from the upper-middle class socio-economic 
strata. It is a school which may fairly be described as being homogeneous in language, social class 
and what may loosely be called 'culture'. Adopting a perspective of 'culture' is one way in which 
my question could be approached. It is often associated with the use of 'social class' to analyse the 
pedagogic relationship. It would be useful then to refer to literature which approach the pedagogic 
relationship from the perspectives of 'culture' and 'class'. 
Pane (2010) writes about classroom management strategies in United States urban contexts. In the 
US, ''urban'' educational contexts are described as being "heavily populated with students of 
colour . . . large number[ s] of students from lower socioeconomic status, high attrition of teachers, 
heavy institutional and systemic barriers, and meagre resources ... grossly underfunded ... (Milner 
2006 in Pane 2010: 88). A useful concept found in her article is that of "culturally responsive 
pedagogy". She describes the problems which inhere in these contexts as resulting from (i) ''the 
American phenomenon of exclusionary discipline"; and (ii) two conventional interpretations of 
Vygotsky's notion of the zone of proximal development (IDe. cit.). Her article surveys alternative 
approaches, such as a "culturally responsive pedagogy", "critical social practice view of learning" 
and a "communities of practice perspective". There is an emphasis on anthropological research and 
the social nature of learning (IDe. cit.: 88; 93ff.). Anthropology is understood as a study of that 
which constitutes meaning, in everyday practices, to participants in various socio-cultural contexts 





























































states: "Teachers must possess dispositions and knowledge of how to incorporate 'the cultures, 
experiences, and needs of their students into their teaching' to provide opportunities for success at 
school (loc. cit.: 91). Although the issues addressed by Pane may be more serious than mine when 
viewed from socio-economic and political perspectives, the pedagogic issues follow the same 
pattern as the description of my personal engagement with pedagogy: there are barriers and pitfalls 
to learning which exist at various levels, some of which are specifically related to the teacher's 
assumptions about the learner. The teachers assumptions interact with various facets of the student. 
Some of these facets which are of interest to me include: that which has everyday meaning for 
students in their day to day relations with their peers, their families, their social networks and with 
themselves; their level of interest and degree of perseverance with difficulties in learning the 
pedagogic content. All of which addresses the original question, "What is the best way to teach this 
topic?", in order to get the student to learn. Panes's article, does, however, differ slightly here, in a 
significant way, in that she seeks to address the more general question, "What is the best way to 
teach?". Pane's article foregrounds the general nature of the relation between teacher and student, 
independently of any particular subject discipline. 
In both cases, though (both Pane's and mine), we are confronted with the issue of resistance to the 
smooth functioning of pedagogic practice as transmission-acquisition of knowledge. My solution is 
the formation of an hypothesis about the student(s) addressed. My lesson planning follows from the 
hypothesis. My hypothesis is based on my understanding of what the learner is like both personally 
and as a student of mathematics, for example. I construct an image of the student and my teaching is 
tailored around that image. However, the student's image of themselves does not - almost certainly 
does not - correspond to my image of them. My pedagogic communication, therefore, addresses an 
imaginary student, and as such, is inherently limited in its pedagogic effectiveness. I may even end 
up completely mis-recognising the actual student in my imaginary identification. The nature of 
pedagogic intereaction is so complex that I may not get the necessary feedback from the student to 
let me know that I am miscommunicating with him. Occasionally such feedback does happen in an 
overt way - and when such feedback does happen it may be verbally articulated or take the form of 
what is termed 'disruptive behaviour'. 
My 'hypothesis of the student' may, therefore, be described as an imaginary identification which 






















then attempts to traverse. The gap exists in the differences between teacher and pupil with respect to 
what kind of knowledge is regarded as meaningful and worth having. My 'hypothesis of the student' 
should, therefore, at least be a 'working hypothesis' which is constantly subject to modification. 
However, I never seem to be able to fully represent the student in my hypotheses - there is always 
something in the student which escapes representation in my hypotheses. 
A similar comment could be made about attempts at inclusive pedagogy, such as that discussed in 
Pane's article above. Despite the mUltiple references to theory, Pane's argument falls into a similar 
trap through its misrecognition of the learner. Pane suggests a somewhat radically-sounding 
"cultural synchronisation" (Pane 2010: 88 - 89) in order to enact a "culturally responsive 
pedagogy". It is a methodology for producing more effective pedagogic communication. This 
approach advocates the empathic engagement of the teacher with the students (in Pane's case, black 
American students in urban schools) at the level of the culture of the student. But this necessitates 
the formation of a normalised description of what it means to be 'black American' - and so Pane 
quotes research that supplies just that: "[A ]nthropological and historical research . . . advances the 
fmding that black Americans have a distinct culture founded on identifiable norms, language, 
behaviours, and attitudes from Africa. . .. The retention of identifiable and distinct African culture 
in America, especially in 'lower-class black communities ... '" results in cultural incongruity which 
is manifested in the pedagogic problems addressed by the article. Pane goes on to quote research 
which describes in detail the qualities that distinguish "African culture" from "European culture" 
(Pane 2010: 88). The argument is that teachers should structure their pedagogic communication 
around the qualities of "African culture" and its implications for "lower class black communities". 
However, it is precisely the sweeping generalisation about black Americans in lower-class 
communities which leads to a misrecognition of the individual student who is the presumed 
beneficiary of such an approach. By positing the existence of a distinct "African culture" the article 
constructs an imaginary student with which to engage on a more ethnographically 'authentic' level 
of communication. This is posited as the solution but it actually draws attention away from the more 
fundamental problem of the internal limits of the pedagogic relationship. And it is the internal limits 
which actually generates the need for more effective pedagogic communication I. The foregrounding 
of cultural sensitivity in pedagogic communication thereby obfuscates the problem of a frustrating 
Anthropological / ethnographic researchers in education tend to start with this need for effective communication and 






















feature, which is seemingly inherent to the pedagogic relationship and independent of cultural 
specificities. 
We see the failure of the 'culturally responsive' approach clearly demonstrated in the movie 
Freedom Writers (LaGravenese: 2006). The movie turns on the tension generated when the 
assumptions of an initiate, 'white', middle-class English language teacher (Erin Gruwell) are 
confronted by the reality of her ethnically diverse, working-class students, some of whom are 
'black', 'asian' or 'hispanic'. Gang warfare, rap music, dysfunctional families, poor academic 
performance as well as general apathy towards education are some of the commonalities shared by 
her culturally diverse group of students. In an attempt to arrest their attention in order to teach a 
lesson on internal rhyme, she employs precisely the strategy of 'culturally responsive pedagogy' 
suggested by Pane. The lesson starts with an excerpt from a rap song by Tupac Shakur. The teacher 
then refers to the blackboard where she has written an extracted verse from the song. As soon as she 
kicks off her appeal to internal rhyme on the grounds of cultural identification, she runs into direct 
confrontation from the students on the grounds of her lack of knowledge of the reality of their lives. 
In the place of the 'connection' between teacher and pupil that this act of empathy intended, the 
teacher is framed as an imposter with no right to speak about Shakur's music as if she understood 
what was depicted in the lyrics: a representation of the students' harsh reality of violence and 
economic deprivation, which the teacher had corrupted through her disrespect of the students' actual 
identifications. 
But even in classrooms where there is less cultural separation between teacher and pupils, a variety 
of methods is used to enable learning. Alexander (2001) provides a broad analysis of the 
relationship between culture and pedagogy in Culture and pedagogy: international comparisons in 
primary education. His research covers education in five countries (England, Prance, Russia, India, 
and Michigan in the USA) at three ,levels: the official level of national policy, the level of the school 
and the interactional level of classroom teaching (op. cit.: 3 - 5). The breadth of his study is far 
greater than the concern of this essay. My reference to this work here is simply in terms of my very 
narrow focus on the pedagogic relationship. Within Alexander's text, it is the level of classroom 
teaching that is of most pertinence for this essay. In order to facilitate a reasonably valid 
comparative analysis of the empirical data from the five countries, Alexander "dispensed with 






















grounded in teaching as it happens, working from the proposition that 'teaching, in any school 
setting, is the act of using method x to enable pupils to learn y'" (Alexander 2001: 535; ref also 
p.323). This proposition formed one of two basic propositions which constituted Alexander's 
attempt to reduce teaching to its barest essentials. The other proposition is: "Teaching has structure 
and form; it is situated in, and governed by, space, time and patterns of pupil organization; and it is 
undertaken for a purpose" (op. cit.: 323). These propositions formed the basis of Alexander's 
"action-based framework for the analysis of teaching" in which teaching is framed external to the 
classroom by the curriculum and internally by ways of organizing space, time, and pupils, and the 
particular micro-culture of the classroom; teaching has its form in the lesson; and the teaching act 
comprised task, activity, interaction and judgement (op. cit.: 325). As relates to this essay, the 
propositions allowed a general orientation to answering important basic questions: "What are pupils 
expected to learn?; [w]hat method does the teacher use to ensure that they do so?; as well as the 
question of agency in curriculum 'delivery' (op. cit: 323). The first pair of questions refers back to 
my personal reflection on 'how best to teach' a given topic. But it also refers to the act of teaching as 
defined by Alexander's action-based framework. "A teaching method", suggests Alexander, 
"combines tasks, activities, interactions andjudgements" each of which has a specific function (op. 
cit.: 323), with ''judgements'' being further separated into two phases: "differentiation" and 
"assessment". This four-part schema for method was fruitfully applied by Alexander in the analysis 
of classroom teaching recordings across the five countries in his study. It implies that teaching is not 
just a simple process of transmission-acquisition, but instead entails a complex set of strategies to 
enable learning. Pedagogic communication is strategic: a lesson plan is a strategy x employed to 
enable pupils to learn y. And this phenomenon is international. It reflects something of the nature of 
the pedagogic relationship which is simply not straightforward. 
This sense of the complexity of the pedagogic relationship is confirmed when we consider the 
question of agency. I would like to extract the following two comments from Alexander's book: 
"[ ... J it is still probably fair to suggest that for most people education still means what 
teachers and pupils do in classrooms and what pupils learn, rather than what teachers 
intend and where it all takes place. Moreover, the relationship [between teacher and 
pupil] is generally presumed to be an uncomplicated and linear one: pupils learn x 
because teachers teach in manner y" (op. cit.: 270, emphasis added). 





















"we view curriculum as undergoing a sequence of transformations as it progresses from 
published document to school syllabus and teacher plan, and thence to lesson, task, activity 
and interaction. The final and most important act of curriculum transformation takes place 
inside the pupil's head" (op. cit.: 324, emphasis added). 
Alexander, hits the nail on the head here. Whatever the intention of the national policy makers, the 
school or the teacher, the pupil is the point at which the intended smooth operation of educational 
transmission-acquisition is either realised or comes up against forms of resistance to its realisation. 
This is the reason why the relationship between teacher and pupil is simply not an ''uncomplicated 
and linear one". The potential for unintentional and alternative meanings to be generated during 
each lesson exists precisely because the "fmal and most important act of curriculum transformation 
takes place in the pupil's head". Of course, the worst case scenario is that the pupil is absolutely 
unreceptive to the teacher. In any case, it is with respect to this final stage in curriculum 
transmission-acquisition that the pupil may be said to offer resistance to the intended curriculum. 
And, in view of the immanent potential of resistance, this is precisely why the method of teaching is 
necessarily a matrix of strategies. 
We are given a hint that the matrix of strategies may indeed be associated with social class and 
culture. In Dowling and Brown (2007) we are presented with analyses of three schools in the 
Western Cape province, South Africa. The study draws upon data collected in 1996 - 1997 and re-
analysed in 2007. The schools located in different geographical areas still reflect the class and 
cultural norms which emerged during the apartheid regime when the education of different 'races' 
was administered by segregated departments of education with gross inequalities in both their 
budgets and levels of political influence. It is a legacy of the fragmentation caused by apartheid that 
class and cultural norms are still closely associated with the former apartheid. groupings in 
geographical areas; and the teachers themselves form part of these groupings. Dowling and Brown 
clearly demonstrate the impact of these norms on pedagogy. The schools were, respectively, a 
former model-C school (serving predominantly 'whites'), a school located in a township (serving 
'blacks'), and a school, which is described in the text as exhibiting " . . . a highly complex case 
A of ... class condensation", serving 'coloureds' (Dowling & Brown 2007: 3, 5). They present three 
cases in which we can clearly see evidence of what Pane (2010) referred to as 'cultural 
synchronisation'. The teachers, almost by default, are practising a 'culturally responsive pedagogy'. 
Yet the outcomes in these three schools are remarkably different from the point of view of 
successful curriculum reproduction: the privileged, ex-model-C schools regularly produce the 





















majority of the matriculation results with access to university programmes; the township schools 
generally fail to conform to the standards for matriculation exemption; while the 'coloured' schools 
are somewhere in between2• What is strikingly obvious, however, are the differences in pedagogic 
relationships across the three schools (Dowling & Brown 2007: 9 - 10, 11, 12, 15 - 16,25 - 26), 
employing a variety of strategies to effect transmission-acquisition of the curriculum. These 
strategies include exposition, choral responses, overhead projections, conversation and debate, 
diagrams on the blackboard or whiteboard, photocopied notes and pictures, posters, textbooks, 
unpredictability, and even shaming (op. cit.: 9, 15 - 16, 17, 18 - 19,25 - 26). Dowling and Brown's 
text is a small scale study that indicates that strategies are clearly an immanent component of the 
pedagogic relationship in the act of teaching. The study also clearly shows that the phenomenon of 
'teaching strategies' are independent of class and culture: they appear in various guises in each 
classroom. 'Teaching strategies' are a phenomenon which, therefore, points to some aspect of the 
pedagogic relationship which exists at a more fundamental level than culture or class. Something 
which is associated with the core function of the teacher: transmission-acquisition of the 
curriculum. I would like to suggest that this more fundamental feature of the pedagogic relationship 
is the thing which drives pedagogic communication in terms of the strategies employed by the 
teacher. Dowling and Brown have noted that the purpose of these pedagogic strategies is to "ensure 
that the curriculum gets into the books, as well as the heads, of the students" (op. cit.: 25). This 
statement is reminiscent of Alexander's assertion regarding the transformation of the curriculum 
from its policy phase to its phase as something acquired in the pupils's heads. Pedagogic strategies 
arise out of a need to control, as best as possible, the form of the acquired phase of the curriculum. 
It is this transformative effect of the pupil on the acquired curriculum which functions as a driving 
fundamental feature of the pedagogic relation. This feature is a reference to the nature of the 
teacher-student relation which forms the central theme of my discussion to be developed in the 
chapters that follow. 
1.2 ReaL symbolic and imaeinar:y 
The references to teaching strategies, cultural sensitivies, etc., which I have made above may be 
described in more theoretically orientated terms by using the notions of real, symbolic and 
imaginary developed by Jacques Lacan (see Lacan 1981, 1996; Evans 2006; Bailly 2009). The 

























various methods and theories described above which are applied in the study of the pedagogic 
relation are all attempts at theorising under the aspect of the imaginary. These theories are couched 
in terms of the perceptions of researchers, teachers and learners, with an overriding concern with 
what is directly observable; for example, when referring to ''black Americans" with an "African 
culture", the descriptive elements referred to are those which are immediate to sensory perception. 
The theoretical approach of structuralist anthropologists offer, however, a more profound analytical 
description of social relations. Levi-Strauss identified that societies in general, whether considered 
to be primitive or modem, were constituted by structural components such as kinship relations and 
the circuit of exchange (vis. Evans 2006: 203)3. Such studies take the theoretical effort one step 
further, moving beyond the immediate to the mediated order of conceptual structures and their 
necessary relations. It is the contribution of structuralist anthropology which allows for a principled 
account of social relations in place of descriptions of specific 'cultures' as encountered at the level 
of immediacy. This approach permits a deeper form of 'cultural sensitivity' - a form that is founded 
on a conceptually grounded basis in which the structures of social relations are emphasised rather 
than the contingent phenomena encountered in social relations4• It permits this deeper engagement 
with culture because it is formulated under the aspect of the symbolic rather than the imaginary. 
Indeed, it is from this account of the social that "Lacan takes from Levi-Strauss the idea that the 
social world is structured by certain laws which regulate kinship relations and the exchange of 
gifts" (Evans 2006; see also Bailly 2009: 94) . This is supported by a reference to Marcel Mauss: 
"The structures of society are symbolic; individuals, insofar as they are normal, use them in real 
behaviors" (Lacan 1999). The symbolic, in Lacan, refers to this aspect of the social as well as to the 
symbolic logic employed to describe the natural world in physics, for example (Evans 2006: 203 -
204). 
The 'real ' in Lacan is that which the symbolic and the imaginary attempts to capture, yet it is that 
which the symbolic order is incapable of symbolising because it "resists symbolisation absolutely" 
(Fink 1995). Another important feature of the real is that, in contrast to images which are allocated a 
place in the individual's maintenance of a coherent 'reality', or to a symbolic order of signifiers in 
which each signifier has its place in a metonymic chain of meaning, the "real whatever upheavel we 
3 Evans refers to Levi-Strauss (1949) The effectiveness of symbols, in Structural Anthropology, pp. J 86-205 . 
trans. Claire Jacobson (1963) and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf. New York: Basic Books. 






















subject it to, is always and in every case in its place; it carries its place stuck to the sole of its shoe, 
there being nothing that can exile it from it" (Lacan 1999: 17). This is another way of saying that 
one cannot structure the real. The real is a stubborn, persistent presence which does not yield to 
anything symbolic or imaginary. As such, its presence emerges most pertinently in the disruption of 
the smooth operation of the symbolic chain of 'meaningful' events and most poignantly in the 
disfigurement of the imaginary. 
At the level of interactional practice, the structure of the pedagogic discourse may even be said to 
behave as the syntax of the client's discourse in psycho-analysis. It "proceeds towards the 
condensation around the nucleus", which belongs to the order of the real "in so far as the identity of 
perception is its rule" (Lacan 1981: 68). In pedagogic practice, the order of the real functions as the 
disruption of the imaginary-symbolic order when pedagogic discourse and our 'model-image of the 
student' - our assumptions and hypotheses of the target audience of pedagogy - are unexpectedly 
disrupted in the interactional practice of pedagogy. It is this rupture to pedagogic communication 
and the disfigurement of our hypothesis of the student which signals a rethink of our pedagogic 
approach. 
We have already commented, in section 1.1, on the enlisting of the imaginary in 'theorising' the 
pedagogic relation. The purpose of this essay is to respond to the question of a feature of the 
pedagogic relation which necessitates interventions to ensure its smooth functioning. In contrast to 
the aforementioned approaches to this immanent pedagogic problem, in which there is an 
overdetermination of the imaginary in theorising the real of the teacher-student relation, it is my aim 
in this essay to attempt a statement of this question in terms of the real and the symbolic. To 
paraphrase Lacan, 
"What is a praxis? I doubt whether this tenn may be inappropriate to [pedagogy]. It is the broadest 
tenn to designate a concerted human action, whatever it may be, which places man in a position to 
treat the real by the symbolic. The fact that in doing so he encounters the imaginary to a greater or 
lesser degree is only of secondary importance here" (Lacan 1981: 6). 
It is the praxis of education to treat the real of the student by the symbolic order of pedagogic 
discourse. Bernstein's (1990) notion of pedagogic discourse refers to the principle by which 
discourses from the field of production (mathematics, physics, history, etc.) are selected for 
.~ recontextualisation to produce the instructional discourse: the school knowledge of subjects taught 













































































at school; this instructional discourse is embedded within a discourse of regulation. Regulation is 
effected on the deportment of the student as well as on the form of the knowledge reproduced. The 
knowledge selected by pedagogic discourse thus gains the status of privileged knowledge while the 
discourse of regulation aims to reproduce privileged orientations to meaning with respect to 
relations within the body of privileged knowledge, the relations of the student to knowledge and the 
social relations within the classroom. The implications of this are to be observed in the form of 
(moral) regulation on the student, such as which is cogently argued by Zain Davis (2005a), and in 
the regulation of the productions/reproductions of classroom activities, evidence for which is 
presented in meticulous detail by Chitsike (2011). 
1.3 The reality of resgtagce 
My concern in this essay is to provide an analytic description of the pedagogic relation as such, 
which is a condition prior to the 'treatment' of any particular student in any particular academic 
subject. In terms of the real, symbolic and imaginary, pedagogic discourse is the principle in terms 
of which the teacher encounters the real of the student as a presence which is stubbornly resistant to 
the reproduction of pedagogic knowledge and values as forms of consciousness and conscience. It 
is the pedagogic discourse which then attempts to capture the real of the student in the symbolic 
order of a specialised consciousness and conscience. 
This is a necessary condition of pedagogy for there would be no need for pedagogy if the status quo 
of knowledge were that of a universal consciousness: the very existence of 'education' is an index of 
the absence of a completely universal and homogeneous consciousness; while the existence of 
pedagogic theories and teaching strategies is an index of an immanent breakdown of education 
systems to do the job of reproducing knowledge completely without flaw or omissions. This latter 
point is borne out by the fact that all education systems have a graduated system of measures 
ii integrated into the regulation of students: this is nothing but the acknowledgement that education 
indeed fails, and that a certain degree of failure must necessarily be accommodated6• The point that 
we should extract here is that the student is just that resistant presence which, qua real, is "always 
and in every case in its place; stuck to the sole of its shoe, there being nothing that can exile it from 
A~ 
i. 5 Refer Davis 2004: 46 
~ 6 Commonly an assessment score of 50% is used, although presently in South Africa a minimum of 30% is allowed 
~I.' ' 
l under certain conditions. Accommodation of failure is made in order to ensure that, from a pragmatic point of view, 























But this is not to say that the student is a problem, in the sense of referring to 'behavioural problems' 
or 'learning difficulties'. Despite the failure of education in reproduction, the student's resistant and 
disruptive presence shows up precisely where it should be - as the ignorance which education aims 
to replace with knowledge, and, consequently, in the necessary failed attempts of interpellation of 
the student in pedagogic discourse, where the various degrees of failure are the result of the pre-
existing ignorance. 
1.4 Summary and preview 
We have seen thus far that in order to answer my simple question about the best way to teach a 
lesson, that the discussion has developed towards a consideration of more general concepts implied 
in the question. We started with a mere personal hypothesis about the nature of the student. We then 
introduced a consideration of two familiar themes in education theory: culture and social class. In a 
more general sense, these considerations represent attempts to theorise the nature of the relationship 
between the teacher and the student. I then introduced Lacan's notions of the real, symbolic and 
imaginary as an appurtenance which offers a more nuanced analysis of the pedagogic relation. The 
resultant understanding of this analysis was that pedagogic relations are structured by the resistant 
presence of the student qua real, which teachers engage with in an approach framed by the symbolic 
order. 
It follows that, in order to answer the question of how best to teach any particular subject, a 
consideration of the pedagogic relationship is a reasonable starting point. It is in the pedagogic 
relationship that we have a singular concept that entails all the salient features of teaching: the 
1 nature of the student in relation to the nature of the teacher, both of which are in relation to 
;e 
:11: knOWledge. It is the implications of this relation that are encountered as phenomena in the 
J~ 
classroom requiring 'management' in order to ensure that the education system achieves its aim of 
if 
curriculum transmission and reproduction. These implications may be described as the restless 
dynamics of the pedagogic relation - that aspect of the teacher-pupil relation which transforms a 
, , 







































































































Ostensibly, this relationship is about teaching and learning; but we know that the entailed process is 
not a smooth transmission and acquisition of knowledge: the graduated system of measuring 
degrees of 'passing' is actually a graduated system of degrees of failure of the pedagogic process. It 
is the way in which the education system always-already accommodates for its own failure at 
transmission-acquisition. And as a consequence to this fact, there arises the necessity of teaching 
methodologies as pedagogic strategies to circumvent the encounter with that which frustrates the 
transmission and acquisition of the curriculum. 
t I: 
!I A consideration of the pedagogic relationship therefore not only entails the student, the teacher and 
1 
" knowledge, but also a component offering resistance to their relations and thereby generating the 
~,:,i;.,;i question of what constitutes the best teaching methods. Our discussion may therefore be seen to 
'1 have distilled into four distinct entities: the teacher, the student, knowledge and a resistant 
~ 
component in the relationship between the first three. This resistance may appear to be that of 
cultural or class differences but it is clear that even within homogeneous populations there is 
variation of results amongst pupils and the teachers' sense of a necessity to strategise in the act of 
teaching. 
At this stage of the essay, having generalised the discussion to some extent, it would be appropriate 
to state the more general question which concerns this dissertation: Is there a theory that adequately 
accounts for the rich and subtle dynamics of the pedagogic relation? 
The general problem of this dissertation is to produce, as non-arbitrary and principled, a description 
of the pedagogic relation with respect to the core activity of teaching - that of transmission-
acquisition. The account must be structured by necessity and retain its focus on the interactional 
























THE PEDAGOGIC RELATION IN BERNSTEIN 
2.1 Why Bernstein? 
Bernstein's socio-linguistic theory provides a sound base from which to work since it is in his 
theory that we get closest to a description of the pedagogic relation in terms of necessity, that is, in 
terms of the causal chain characteristic ofa symbolic order rather than the ego-identifications of an 
imaginary order. This may be illustrated by reference to the afore-mentioned citation of Pane (2010) 
in which breakdown in pedagogy was attributed to the failure of teachers to identify with "African 
culture". 
Pedagogy would proceed effectively if teachers enacted sufficient sensitivity to this cultural feature. 
The features of "African culture" were then listed. It is this list of observed features of behaviour 
that I am here designating as the "ego-identifications of the imaginary order". They are imaginary 
because the descriptions are drawn from images in the specular field of sensory perception. There is 
no attempt to theorise the semantic charge of these behaviours. With this approach we are offered 
merely a description of the social at the level of immediacy. According to Pane, the teacher's 
awareness and accommodation of the behaviours characteristic of black African Americans will 
promote a more effective pedagogy. Bernstein offers a completely different way of thinking about 
the problem. Moving from the immediate in the empirical field into the mediating field of theory, he 
has explained failure in pedagogy in terms of the primary socialisation of children for the 
acquisition of coding orientations, and the misfit of the acquired code with that of the coding 
orientation of the education system (Bernstein 1975). 
The choice of a sociological theory rather than a theory from another field is supported if we heed 
the words of Durkheim's assertion that "every time a social phenomenon is directly explained by a 
psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that the explanation is false" (Durkheim 1982: 
129). While not aiming to detract from the contributions of psychology, it must be admitted that its 
focus is the individual and intrapsychic processes. Only in Soviet psychology do we get an 
appreciation that these intrapsychic processes are formed in social relations. Work in this direction 

































Miettin 1999; Kozulin 2003; also Kaptelinin & Nardi 2006; Kaptelinin, Nardi & Macaulay 1999); 
while Daniels (2001) has sought to integrate activity theory with Bernstein's sociolinguistic theory. 
Activity theory, however, does the same thing as the educational system when it takes into account, 
as a priori, its necessary point of failure in the problems of communication and the hurdles to be 
overcome in a collaboration around an object: it takes the points of failure into account as part of 
the activity, around which strategies are devised to overcome them. This is all to say that activity 
theory does not provide an explicit account of the missed-encounters of agents and misrecognitions 
of the object internal to the sphere of the activity. In Bernstein's sociology we. are assured that it 
foregrounds the relation between the individual and the symbolic order, for it explicitly engages 
with categorical relations of teacher, student, knowledge, class, age, gender, etcetera. And it is the 
relation between the teacher and the student, as interpellated in the symbolic order, which takes 
centre stage in this dissertation. 
This notion may be coupled with another caveat, again from Durkheim, regarding educational 
theory in particular: 
"if educational theory goes beyond its proper limits, if it pretends to supplant experience, to 
promulgate ready-made formulae that are then applied mechanically, it degenerates into dead 
matter. If, on the other hand, experience disregards pedagogical thinking, it in turn degenerates 
into blind routine or else is at the mercy of ill-informed or unsystematic thinking. Educational 
theory essentially is the most methodical and best-documented thinking available, put at the 
service of teaching" (Durkheim 1961: 2). 
Bernstein's research and prolific writings on education provides a detailed and comprehensive 
analysis of education in tenns of the relations between culture, class, knowledge and educational 
transmissions. The concepts introduced by Bernstein provide structuralist accounts of educational 
phenomena according to a demonstrated necessity, while retaining a flexible allowance for change 
at the points of contradiction highlighted by the theory. We note along with Hassan that: 
"Bernstein was a sociologist convinced that no sociological theory could account adequately for 
the production and reproduction of society without taking into consideration the part played in the 
process by the social subjects themselves, which naturally implied, on the one hand, attention to 
forms of consciousness and, on the other, an account of how and why these forms coexist in most 
modem societies" 
(Hassan quoted in Davies 2007: 2) 























studies described above by Dowling and Brown, there are still gaping differences in performance 
between these schools. While we may offer reasons such as lack of resources and adequate teacher 
training for the differences in performance, such reasons fail to account for the underperformance of 
the so-called 'Dinaledi' schools7• We may, however, fmd a satisfactory explanation in Bernstein's 
sociolinguistic theory of educational transmissions. The differences in performance could be 
accounted for in terms of Bernstein's "code theory". The notions of "elaborated codes" and 
"restricted codes" are associated with middle-class and working-class communities respectively 
(see Bernstein 1990: 14 - 20 for an example of the discussion of code theory; and Holland 1981, for 
a seminal empirical study based on coding orientations to meanings). A more detailed discussion of 
these case studies cannot be provided here, given the constraints of this dissertation. It must be 
remarked, however, that code theory and its notion of coding orientations will provide valuable 
insight into the structure of the pedagogic relation, but that it will have an enhanced value if applied 
in conjunction with Lacan's notions of the real, symbolic and imaginary orders. 
In this chapter we will explore Bernstein's ideas for commentary on the pedagogic relationship. The 
main ideas are drawn from his discussion on the pedagogic device. 
2.2 The pedaKQaC relationship in Bernstein 
We have already seen that it is Bernstein's notion of pedagogic discourse that allows for a link with 
Lacan's 'treatment of the real by the symbolic' on the question of the dynamics of the pedagogic 
relationship. Pedagogic discourse has its place in Bernstein's over-arching notion of the pedagogic 
device. A few words on the pedagogic device is therefore required to provide a more complete 
understanding of pedagogic discourse. 
" Bernstein's notion of the pedagogic device represents the matrix of agents and institutions, within a 
H 
!I given social division of labour and distribution of power. The pedagogic device is the mechanism 
t ~r which transforms knowledge from the field of production into knowledge for the classroom. Refer, 
i 
C! for example, to the diagram Bernstein produces to illustrate his vision of the field of research for 
if "any theory which attempts to link pedagogic communication with pedagogic 
consciousness/conscience [in which] ... The basic question to be asked is always with reference to 
7 Not featured in Dowling and Brown's article, these are State-initiated focus schools for mathematics and science, 
























the privileging pedagogic text" (Bernstein 1990: 172): 
.Whlr .,. 
±C"t.r _--. ........ -7I .... : ..... -... -. ---: 
(Illustration 1: Bernstein's Field of Research, 1990: 173) 
The knowledge constructed in the pedagogic device and transmitted by the teacher for acquisition 
by the student is referred to as pedagogic discourse. Bernstein discusses the pedagogic relationship 
under the broader context of the pedagogic device. It is within the pedagogic device that pedagogic 
discourse is constructed. The pedagogic device "generates a symbolic ruler of consciousness" and it 
is ''the condition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture" (Bernstein 1990: 
180). It functions as a mechanism for the reproduction of culture and class, and is hereby implicated 
in the maintenance of social fracturing. We will explore what his discussion has to say about the 
jf nature of the pedagogic relationship in terms of the teacher, the student, knowledge and resistance. 
~ The importance of the pedagogic device as a concept in Bernstein is found in the following 
! t postulate and definition: "We shall postulate that between power and knowledge, and knowledge 
. It
and forms of consciousness, is always the pedagogic device (PD) [and we] shall defme the 
pedagogic device as the distributive, recontextualizing and evaluative rules for specializing forms of 
consciousness" (Bernstein 1990: 181, italics in original) . 





















The three rules are hierarchically organised. Distributive rules regulate the rules for 
recontextualisation, which in turn regulates the rules for evaluation. "The rules of evaluation are 
constituted in pedagogic practice" (Bernstein 1990: 180). In empirical terms, pedagogic practice 
defines the pedagogic relationship. 
For Bernstein, pedagogic practice constitutes the rules for evaluation. Evaluation concerns the 
regulation of whatever counts as legitimate production in the classroom. It follows from this 
assertion that the essential feature of a pedagogic relation is that of regulation on the behaviour, 
speech and written work of the class. Pedagogic practices mediate the regulation on pupils in 
addition to the more obvious task of mediating knowledge of the subject. Bernstein accounts for this 
two-fold function of pedagogic transmission-acquisition in the concept of pedagogic discourse. 
Bernstein defines ''pedagogic discourse as the rule which embeds a discourse of competence (skills 
of various kinds) into a discourse of social order in such a way that the latter always dominates the 
former" (Bernstein 1990: 183). The discourse of specialised competence is termed "instructional 
discourse" and the discourse of social order is termed "regulative discourse", and the relation 
between the two is represented by "IDIRD" in which the oblique means 'embedded in' (loc. cit.). In 
accordance with the distribution of power, pedagogic discourse selects knowledge from the field of 
production for transformation into what is regarded as legitimate knowledge for the classroom. At 
the level of the classroom, the teacher regulates how knowledge is distributed, understood and 
reproduced by pupils. Phrased abstractly, ''pedagogic discourse is a principle for appropriating 
other discourses and bringing them into special relation with each other for the purposes of their 
selective transmission and acquisition" (Bernstein 1990: 183 - 184, italics in original). 
We may restate the forgoing discussion succinctly by stating that a pedagogic relation is a 
regulating function constituted in pedagogic practice, which in turn is regulated by pedagogic 
discourse. The nature of the pedagogic discourse may be understood by referring, ultimately, to the 
distributive rule which regulates the distribution of power and controls the social division of labour, 





















2.3 Abroad discussion of Bernstein's references to resistance and antaeonjsm in the 
pedaeQeic relatiOnship 
It was noted above, with reference to Lacan's notions of real, symbolic and imaginary, that the 
relation between the student and knowledge is structured by the resistance characteristic of the real. 
From an analytical point of view, the dynamic of resistance is the most substantial we have isolated 
so far in our consideration of the pedagogic relation. We should, therefore, devote some effort to 
picking up references to resistance made in Bernstein. 
The most general references to resistance in pedagogic contexts found in Bernstein are on 
discussions on "The social construction of pedagogic discourse" (Bernstein 1990: 165ff.). A 
discussion of these references to resistance follows. 
Bernstein introduces the chapter with a discussion of the theoretical field on culture reproduction, 
and situates his thesis as a contribution to this field with respect to the role formal education plays 
in the reproduction of culture. References to resistance are in terms of the way cultural theorists 
refer to education as a carrier of "messages of patterns of dominance" and in terms of theories that 
put "agency before structure, that shows the way in which groups themselves resist and actively 
oppose pedagogic communication rather than being positioned byit" (ibid.: p. 171). 
During this discussion Bernstein quite frequently uses the terms "cultural resistance/reproduction" 
or "cultural reproduction/resistance" (ibid.: 171, 174, 176). The aim of his discussion is to point to a 
conceptual gap in the theories of culture reproduction. His criticism of theories of "cultural 
reproduction, resistance and transformation" are that they describe the positioning of the pedagogic 
subject with respect to a "privileging text" but "are relatively weak on analyses of 'relations 
within"', by which Bernstein means the grammar of the carrier of the dominant and dominating 
cultural message: the structure of the carrier (''voice'') which necessarily has an affect on the type of 
"message" which it delivers (ibid: 23, 28ff.). The 'grammar' is none other than the three rules we 
have already encountered: the distributive rules, recontextualising rules and rules of evaluation, 






















The importance of the above-mentioned analysis is explained by Bernstein himself: " . . . if we do 
not [understand the 'relations within' a pedagogic text, we can not understand] the relations between 
the 'privileging text' and the consciousness of the pedagogic subject ... and if we do not know this 
how can we talk about reproduction, resistance, transformation?" (ibid: 178). From this statement it 
is clear to see that Bernstein's analysis is founded at some distance to a direct engagement with 
'resistance' in general. Within Bernstein the nature of 'resistance' may only be clarified from a 
perspective of the inner workings of pedagogic communication, namely, the pedagogic device. 
Bernstein then begins to map out the concepts important to his discussion, which, according to him, 
address the 'fundamental relationships which any theory of cultural reproduction has to deal 
with . . . [indeed] any theory which attempts to link pedagogic communication with pedagogic 
consciousness/conscience" (p. 172). In the course of his discussion on these concepts we have 
glimpses of sites which may act as generators of pedagogic resistance. They all arise as possibilities 
from within the logic of the pedagogic device, that is, the potential causes of resistance are a 
function of relations between positions in the educational system. 
When the acquirer is "unequally positioned with respect to the acquisition of . . . the 'privileging 
text' ... [this may be regarded as] having the potential to generate a 'resisting' pedagogic subject". 
The "invidious positioning of pedagogic subjects" appears to be at the centre of all such generative 
sites of resistance to pedagogy (ibid: 178). The peer-group relation of the acquirer is also referred to 
as a "potential threat, from the point of view of 'official pedagogic practice", or a site of potential 
independence, alternative, 'resistance' from the perspective of the acquirer" (p. 179). 
In an extended comment on the potential for resistance within his framework for culture 
reproduction, Bernstein describes its generation as a logical consequence of the principles of control 
imposed upon a pedagogic context - that is, the "framing" of pedagogic practices. I will first briefly 
discuss this concept, and the related concept of "classification", and then continue with the quote. 
Framing describes the form of control over the principles of communication. It "refers to the 
t principle regulating the communicative practices of the social relations within the reproduction of 




























relations are regulated in terms of framing. And these relations may be thought of in terms of 
categories and category relations. The constitution of these categories follows from the principle of 
the social division of labour. We may describe the categories in terms of the relative strength of 
insulation between the categories of the social division of labour. The strength of the insulation is 
referred to in terms of "classification" (op. cit.: 24 ff.). Strong classification therefore refers to 
strong insulation producing very clearly demarcated boundaries establishing the identities in the 
social division of labour. Strong framing refers to strong transmitter control over pedagogic 
communicative context. This context is established in terms of two principles: interactional and 
locational. Regulation of the interactional principle includes factors such as lesson sequencing and 
pacing, and the posture and dress of the teacher and pupil. Regulation of the locational principle 
refers to spatial organisation of the pedagogic context, such as the arrangements of desks and other 
objects in the classroom, their attributes and relations to each other. Varying combinations of 
classification and framing strengths constitute various pedagogic code modalities. 
" Any framing carries with it the procedures of its disturbance and challenge ... [through a fonn of 
social solidarity, a group of pupils] who have been disabled by the code [may change] ... the basic 
unit of acquisition [to fonn] non-competitive classroom relations ... Given this change, the new 
group can now substitute its own nonn of production for the teacher's nonns. The group can now 
impose its own realization rules. These may well include sabotaging the means of the [pedagogic 
practice], subverting its rules, assuming aggressive postures. These disturbances and challenges are 
resistances called out by the specific code; they do not necessarily index a move even to declassify, 
let alone to reclassify. Challenge of, or resistance to, the framing of pedagogic practice by 
transmitters or acquirers may be within the tenns of the classificatory principles" 
(Bernstein 1981: 346, italics in original; bold italics mine). 
Of importance in this scenario is that the pupils are positioned as "disabled" by the pedagogic code 
and that the movement in response to this is the institution of a "new norm of production". In other 
words, while the principles of pedagogic communication have changed as a result of resistance, the 
discursive products of the class remain, in general, unchanged. There has been no substantial 
disruption of the pedagogic process with respect to its output because the classificatory principles 
have not been changed. 
Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity (Bernstein 2(00) is Bernstein's last volume on pedagogic 
transmission-acquisition and is the successor to Class, Codes and Control IV. It contains work 
indicating the direction Bernstein had hoped to follow in the development of his theory of pedagogy 






















account for broader issues such as the contemporary state, democracy, and the free market. The 
notion of pedagogy is also broadened to refer to "a fundamental social context through which 
cultural reproduction-production takes place" (Bernstein 2000: 3). 
We find similar thoughts repeated in Bernstein's discussion of education and pedagogy in the 
context of "democracy and pedagogic rights" (Bernstein 2000: Introduction, xx - xxvi). In 
Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity, we still find "transmission and acquisition" and the 
associated orientations to meaning within social class occupying a central part in Bernstein's 
conceptual space (Bernstein 2000: Introduction, xix). Bernstein still locates resistance within the 
pedagogic product of the specialised, class-based coding of educational transmissions in schools 
(Bernstein 2000: Introduction, xxiv). Education, as a public institution, carries inherent "social 
biases" and thereby is "central to the production and reproduction of distributive injustices". This 
exists in tension with the ideal of 'equality for all' in a democratic state. This ideal forms part of a 
democratic morality of equality: access to basic social and economic goods (services and capital in: 
health, education, justice and finance/commerce) must be equally distributed to all citizens for there 
social and economic advancement. Yet "[t]he school necessarily produces a hierarchy based on 
success and failure of students", the causes of which it must mask in order to prevent schism and to 
maintain social solidarity within the school: a sense of community, fairness, and social integration 
within the school population. The school masks the inequalities in two ways: i) by appearing neutral 
and ii) rationalisation of success by the parents of those students who possess the privileged text: 
their children, some way, deserve success while the others do not (Bernstein 2000: Introduction, 
xxii - xxiii). Social solidarity is maintained within age-groups by a "mythological discourse" which 
exists to produce "horizontal solidarity" [the sense of belonging to and sharing in the ethic of a 
particular grade in a school] so as to "contain and ameliorate vertical (hierarchical) cleavages 
between social groups" (Bernstein 2000: Introduction, xxiii). 
Bernstein suggests that "education preserves structural relations between social groups but changes 
structural relations between individuals" (Bernstein 2000: Introduction, xxiv). At the level of the 
M school, this means that failure is individualised by referring the cause of failure to innate qualities ., 
:~y:. 
ii (cognitive or affective), which render the individual inept to the educational environment. This 






















· r pedagogic relationship, Bernstein continues: "With such failure and personal damage there is 
resistance and alienation on the one hand and reinforced peer group loyalties and class solidarities 
on the other. But these solidarities and resistances may be contained in the context of the 
mythological discourses of education. And in this way perhaps orientation is displaced towards 
national consciousness and struggle rather than class consciousness and conflicts" (Bernstein 2000: 
Introduction, xxiv, italics mine). Resistance is contained within the mythological discourses of 
education. Bernstein therefore offers an explanation for resistance as the redirection and 
transmorphism of class conflict away from social class structures to the site and form of the 
individual within a pedagogic relationship within a class room, via a "mythological discourse" of 
"horizontal solidarity". We have here a recontextualising of the site of resistance from the 
macrocosm of social class to the microcosm of the pedagogic relationship. 
In summary, Bernstein locates his theory of the pedagogic device within the general field of the 
sociology of education (op. cit., p. 165). Within this field, a variety of theories of culture 
reproduction, theories of cultural resistance, and theories of critical pedagogy exist, none of which 
have an explicit theory of communication, that is, how the content of pedagogic transmission and 
acquisition is constituted as a function of the field of education (op. cit.,p. 168 - 169). In an attempt 
to fill the conceptual gap for an explicit theory of communication, his theory therefore explicates the 
rules for the production, distribution and reproduction of pedagogic discourse in terms of three 
hierarchically arranged sets of rules, that is, (in descending order of effect): distributive rules, 
recontextualising rules and rules for evaluation. At the heart of distributive rules are rules of social 
distribution of forms of conscience (a discourse of moral order I ideology) and consciousness (a 
discourse of knowledge I practices). The latter is always embedded in the former and this relation of 
embedded discourses constitutes the pedagogic device (op. cit., p. 183). 
Bernstein's model of the pedagogic device may therefore be understood as a theory which explicates 
the grammar for the reproduction of ideology through the education system, that is, the "complex 
relations between power, pedagogic discourse of reproduction, and the distribution of forms of 
consciousness" (op. cit., p. 2(0). "The pedagogic device is a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its 
selective creation, positioning, and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the condition for the 
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Ideology is constituted by categories and power relations between them which are generated by a 
particular balance of power in the State. They are essentially structurally based. Bernstein's 
references to resistance within this context (that is, of the pedagogic device) were constructed at the 
level of symbolic control - a resistance to structural forms - that is, resistance to a particular 
ideological form in its cultural guise (op. cit., pp. 134ff.). There is no reference to the antagonism 
intrinsic to the pedagogic relationship. We should also note that the function of the pedagogic 
device is the selective distribution of forms of consciousness and conscience. Yet, despite the 
selective distribution, the antagonism appears to be generic and independent of the form of 
consciousness and conscience acquired by the learner. This hints at the possibility that the 
antagonism is a function of something immutable - not the expression, but the structure of the 
pedagogic relation set up by the pedagogic communicative context. Within Bernstein's theory of the 
pedagogic device, therefore, is the unrealised potential to address the kind of resistance that forms 
the central concept around which this essay is constructed. I would like to suggest that there is a 
conceptual gap within the theory of the pedagogic device - a point in the theory mute to the general 
experience of teachers and the extensive literature and lucrative industry which has developed 
around the idea of classroom management. This represents a blind spot to the immanent pedagogic 
experience of a kind of 'resistance' different to that referenced by Bernstein: a kind of resistance 
which appears to be intrinsic to the pedagogic relation as such. 
2.4 A Bernsteinjan intimation of Lacan 
In his summary statements regarding the regulation of the communicative context in education, 
Bernstein makes a brief reference to "two levels of tacit practices", which relate to the transmission 
of any given pedagogic code. The significance of these two levels is that Bernstein begins to 
theorise with respect to the conscious and preconscious and then moves to make a very brief 
comment referring to the unconscious. At the level of the conscious, there exist principles of 
classification and control which are a function of the hegemonic social division of labour and the 
implicated social relations. At the level of the preconscious, exist the alternatives to the hegemonic 
social principles, which are a kind of negative expression of the prevailing principles of 
classification and framing, appearing out of the contradictions inherent to any given social division 
of labour and its social relations. But beyond this, Bernstein hints at a third form of pedagogic 
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practice - unconscious practice. "It might be possible to show the relation between the levels of tacit 
practice and that of unconscious practice through the writings of Lacan (1968)8" (Bernstein 1981: 
348). In this statement, I would like to assert, Bernstein implies that input from psychoanalytic 
theory could enhance pedagogic theory. We shall return to this point at a later stage in the 
dissertation. 
We have seen that Bernstein refers to resistance in the context of culture reproduction. He provides 
an adequate account for how such resistance may come about. His account is an exploration of the 
derivative forms of resistance which arise as a consequence of the fact that the education system 
entails a power relation between dominant and dominated ways of being in the world. This power 
relation may also be stated in terms of the resistance which is stimulated by the transmission of a 
privileged text to the exclusion of other forms of meaning-making: there is always a dominant 
discourse in education. The mechanism for the realisation of dominant discourses is "symbolic 
control", which is ''the means whereby consciousness is given a specialized form and distributed 
through forms of communication which relay a given distribution of power and dominant cultural 
categories. Symbolic control translates power relations into discourse and discourse into power 
relations" (Bernstein 1990: 134). In Bernstein, the entities constituting the juxtaposition in the 
power relation are grounded on intrinsically different "codes,,9 which stand in a contrarian relation 
to each other (Bernstein 1990: 40:ff.). "Formal education is essentially predicated on the 
institutionalizing of elaborated orientations and the contingent forms of their realization irrespective 
of differences between social groups in their acquisition" (Bernstein 1990: 40). This sets up the 
condition for resistance: students lacking the elaborated orientation to meaning are "disabled" by 
the code and consequently interact with pedagogy in modes that offer resistance to educational 
transmissions. 
We could make a brief extension to this analysis of the disabling effect of code by conjecturing that 
the modes of resistance may be either passive or active: passive resistance results from an 
acceptance of the disabling effect and compliance with the judgement of academic failure - this is a 
form of unconscious opposition 10; active resistance results from conscious opposition to the 
experience of domination by a privileged discourse, which may be realised in various forms of 
8 Lacan, J. (1968). The language of the self: The function of language in psycho-analysis. Tr. With notes and 
commentary by A. Wilder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 
9 That is, different orientations to meaning-making when comparing middle-class and working-class social groups. 

























































activity, the aim of which is to resist or derail the process of educational transmissions. In either 
case, the educational transmission fails to result in the reproduction of the privileged text as a 
consequence of a relative disparity and incompatibility of "code" in the encounter between 
pedagogic communication and the pupil. 
it While the concepts discussed above may account for the resistance to pedagogic communication 
when disparities of code exist, these concepts, however, do not account for the case of when 
patterns of resistance are still encountered despite there being no disadvantage with respect to code. 
This is the case when groups of predominantly middle class students still produce deviant, and even 
completely erroneous reproductions, despite their theoretical predisposition to successful 
acquisition. And we could justifiably argue that membership of the middle-class is an index for the 
presence of elaborated code". The problem with pedagogic transmission-acquisition and 
reproduction is, therefore, not necessarily related to the "unequal and invidious positioning of 
pedagogic subjects with respect to the 'privileging text"', which is Bernstein's summary of what 
" theories of cultural resistance are all about (Bernstein 1990: 178). There are limits to successful 
acquisition and reproduction across the full spectrum of social class. And these limits refer back to 
the nature of pedagogy and transmission-acquisition as such. Consequently, our problem of 
resistance to pedagogic transmissions has thus been reduced to a consideration of a bare minimum 
of elements: the teacher, the pupil and pedagogic communication. How may we broach the problem 
in terms of these elements? 
Let us remember that our focus is on resistance to pedagogic transmission-acquisition. We have also 
noted that such resistance occurs even within communicative contexts in which the pupils all have 
access to the elaborated code. It is in this consideration that we stumble upon a conundrum in 
Bernstein's theory of educational transmissions. Pupils who have access to the elaborated code 
should, theoretically, acquire and be able to reproduce the privileged text without misconceptions. 
However, a moment's reflection on the distribution of academic achievement in any school will 
convince the reader that this does not happen. There are indeed various levels of faithful acquisition 
and reproduction of the privileged text. This conundrum can not simply be explained in terms of 
Bernstein's codes. Code theory in itself does not provide a satisfactory answer. It is necessary to 
consider an alternative angle of attack on the problem - an angle that accounts for classroom 























reproductions in terms of the relationships between the teacher, the pupil and pedagogic 
communication. 
Let us begin by considering the obvious: the necessity of pedagogic communication. Why the need 
for a specialised form of communication in the educational context? We note that pedagogic 
communication is necessary even when the students are from the middle-class, all socialised into an 
elaborated code and thereby, ostensibly, predisposed to acquisition of educational transmissions. 
The question about specialised pedagogic communication is not adequately addressed by reference 
to "code" and "symbolic control", because these concepts address the communicative context to 
account for reproduction, yet overlook the fact that the success of transmission-acquisition is not 
only dependent on code, but significantly also dependent on the relationship between the transmitter 
and the acquirer. It is this relationship that drives and necessitates pedagogic communication. The 
pedagogic relationship has its own dynamics which are quite distinct from the formal content of 
pedagogic discourse. As such, it places its own limits on the reproductions it aims to achieve, 
irrespective of social class or cultural group. 
We have hereby arrived at a more refined problem. Within Bernstein's code theory of educational 
transmissions we reach a limit for the description of the dynamics of pedagogic communication. 
There is an apparent 'internal horizon' which limits a more dynamic view of the pedagogic relation. 
2.5 A refined statemept of the problem 
Previously I had stated my question as follows: Is there a theory that adequately accounts for the 
rich and subtle dynamics of the pedagogic relation? This may now be refined and restated in the 
following way: 
Starting with Bernstein's theory of educational transmissions, how may we develop his ideas to 
produce a description of the pedagogic relation which is more revealing of its internal dynamics? 
How may we develop Bernstein's theory of pedagogic transmissions to include an adequate model 
of the pedagogic relation with respect to the entailed pedagogic communication at the interactional 






























































It may, therefore, be useful to consider descriptions of the pedagogic relationship which offer 
possibilities of augmenting our descriptions of pedagogic communication: Bernstein's references to 
'transmission-acquisition' has sketched out the basic features of the field, which we now want to 
enhance with some detail. 


























THE SYMBOLIC MANDATE AND THE TEACHER'S VOICE 
The primary means of communication is the teacher's voice. It is also the means by which the 
authority of the teacher is carried; examples of which include the transmission of knowledge, the 
giving of instructions, and the regulation of behaviour in the classroom. In Bernstein, "practices are 
the realization of categories" - they are the materialization of the principles of the social division of 
labour and the associated strength of insulation (Bernstein 1990:23). Phenomenologically, it is what 
is done with the voice that separates teacher from student; while it is the principle of the social 
division of labour in schools that unifies them into the category relation of teacher-pupil (Bernstein 
1990: 26). Bernstein uses the notion of "voice" to represent the rules both forming and maintaining 
category relations, which in this case is the category relation 'teacher-pupil'. Yet it is both the 
"practices" and their "category relation" which are onto logically constitutive of the 'teacher', the 
'student' as well as the pedagogic relation which entails them. Or, in more succinct Bernsteinian 
terms, it is both framing and classification which constitute the category relation teacher-pupil. 
There is a basic form of realization of this pedagogic relation of "voice", whether the pedagogy is 
''visible'' or "invisible"12: the teacher is expected to speak confidently with knowledge about the 
subject and to exercise regulation on the pedagogic space, time and work; while it is permissible 
and even expected of the student to be the bearer of the voice of ignorance and submission. 
We may see that this form of relation must exist as the minimal condition for pedagogic 
transmission-acquisition if we consider the absurd situation of a role reversal. Suppose, in a 
classroom observation that, unannounced, we walk into a classroom along with the pupils. We 
move to our work stations and await a greeting from the teacher. Unknown to us all is that the 
teacher is ill and therefore absent from the class. The class becomes aware of the fact that the 
teacher must be ill. Unsolicited and unannounced, one of the average-achieving pupils steps out to 
the front of the class and begins to issue instructions about what the class is supposed to do. We 
might experience the irony of this situation as a smile shapes our lips, or we might feel that this is 
not 'right'. Either way, this presumptuous pupil has not the authority to use his voice in this manner 
in a classroom context. 
12 Refer Bernstein (1990: 53, 70 - 73) for an explanation of these tenns. See also Bernstein (1990: 22 - 52) for a 





















It is the sense of impropriety that produces either of the two reactions - of humour or indignation. 
Besides the lack of a voice of knowledge, the sub-voice of age would also signify that there is no 
authority in the person standing at the front - instructions received from an adult, whether teacher 
or not might be better received, depending on what he or she was saying. The pupil issuing 
instructions would be seen as an imposter: assuming to have an authority which has not been 
conferred by the school. Following this incident of imposture, we would not expect much 
production in the classroom because the rest of the class, with its voice of ignorance, has lost its 
counterpart in a voice of knowledge and authority. 
Another situational sketch will help to illustrate the social dynamics that I am attempting to draw 
out. Suppose someone arrives with an easel and white board at a busy public square. The white 
board is erected on the easel and the person proceeds to engage in a pedagogic performance, 
q teaching to passers-by (how to factorise a quadratic trinomial, for example). While the speaker may 
believe that she or he has the authority to transmit this information, there are no 'acquirers' filling 
the space with the voice of ignorance and submission. We could easily imagine many a strange look 
or frown upon the faces of passers-by. No one has summoned this person to teach, and yet there is 
the spectre of a teaching performance, as if it were a response made to a voice that no one else 
hears. Under such circumstances we might reasonably wonder if the speaker is psychotic 13 - but not 
so if the same person did the same thing in a classroom of students. So what, we may ask, makes 
the crucial difference for the teacher to be recognised as such? 
3.1 An imposter with a s/ce.ptron 
Bourdieu supplies us with an answer: "The power of words is nothing other than the delegated 
power of the spokesperson, and his speech - that is, that substance of his discourse and, inseparably, 
his way of speaking - is no more than a testimony, and one among others, of the guarantee of 
delegation which is vested in him" (Bourdieu 1992: 107, emphasis in original). 
The authority of the teacher as speaker - the authority of the teacher's voice - lies not within the 
actual language or voice of the teacher, nor even within the knowledge thereby expressed. The 
authority of the teacher comes from outside of the teacher: in the first instance from the delegation 
of authority by hislher appointment to a teaching-post; and secondly via the immediacy of the 




















"interpellation" of the pupils, who, through the principle of the division of labour, "hail" the teacher 
as the one who knows the privileged text, while simultaneously regarding themselves as lacking the 
privileged text (Althusser quoted in Silverman 1983: 48 - 49). The principle of the social division 
of labour, the classification rules, thus constitute the category relation teacher-pupil and the entailed 
gaze: the pupil regards the teacher as one who knows legitimate knowledge; the teacher regards the 
pupil as one lacking the knowledge which the teacher has to offer. The identities of both teacher and 
pupil are thus co-constructed. 
In seeking a description of pedagogic communication, we should remember Bourdieu's assertion 
that "authority comes to language from outside, a fact concretely exemplified by the skeptron that, 
in Homer, is passed to the orator who is about to speak" (Bourdieu 1992: 109). In pedagogic 
communication, the power of the teacher is external to the teacher: vested in the teacher by the State 
and school; and interpellated as voice of authority by the hailing voice of the student lacking 
knowledge and demanding its supply by the teacher. It is ironic to note at this point that the teacher 
becomes 'teacher' completely only when there is a subject willing to speak with the voice of 
ignorance and submission. Yet, in order to perform the function of 'teacher', it is this same ignorance 
'1 which begins to function as a nucleus of resistance that must be overcome as an obstacle to the 
acquisition of the teacher's knowledge. 
The language of the teacher in pedagogic communication at most represents the authority invested 
in the teacher by the State/school and interpellated by the student. In this sense, authority may be 
understood as located extrinsic to the teacher, or, phrased differently, "the [teacher] is an imposter 
endowed with a skeptron" (ibid.). With reference to my earlier situational sketches, this curt phrase 
concisely illustrates the difference between the presumptuous pupil, the psychotic, and the teacher: 
of these three subjects, the one deemed to be the teacher is the one who holds the skeptron. This is 
the quality that discriminates between them; and it is a quality with an external source. There is no 
validity in a skeptron being passed on by oneself to oneself: it is of necessity that the symbolic 
power of the skeptron always originates with an Other who confers it (the examples here being the 
State or school). 
The skeptron, with respect to teaching, stands for the signifiers of conferred authority in which the 




















curiously immanent effect is produced by the structural necessity of extrinsic authority, exemplified 
by the holding of a skeptron. The student's gaze, induced and sustained by the skeptron, is disrupted 
by the crude corporeality of the teacher. Teachers bear the dual properties of real embodiment while 
possessing an elevated status of symbolic power. And as the relationship between teacher and pupil 
develops during the course of the lessons the antagonism of these properties is quickly revealed. 
The teacher, as stated above, must overcome the lack in the pupil. The teacher employs the 
conferred power and knowledge to do so. But the engagement with this lack in the pupil is 
encountered as an obstacle - as a form of resistance to the teacher's function and identity. 
Consequently, there is a sense in which the teacher's striving to realise the conferred power always 
fails as a result of the encounter with the lack in the student. Moreover, it is in this disruption of the 
movement of symbolic power and in the gaze of the student that the teacher's corporeality is shown 
up in even stronger contrast against the failure of power. The student's gaze is disrupted and 
distorted: in the place of the image of a steadfast holder of the skeptron appears the spectre of one 





3.2 The falled phallus and the necessity of fantasy 
In psychoanalytic terms the skeptron, as a marker of power, is a type of phallus. Aoki has asserted 
that "insofar as the teacher embodies the Name of the Father (sic) as the bearer of symbolic law-
the conflation of disciplinary knowledge, in all its senses, with the authority of assessment - the 
teacher purports to have the phallus" (Aoki 2002: 42). But if the phallus marks an assumed 
guarantee of delegation of power to speak, it by no means guarantees success in the transmission 
and acquisition of the disciplinary knowledge. In this respect we are reminded that the performance 
of teaching is structured around an encounter with the void of knowledge in the student, which 
shows up the limits of the teacher's power14. 
The "Lacanian lesson is that no one can really have the phallus, that everyone who 
presumes to possess it is an imposter and a fraud. When the imposture falls apart, 
when the veil of teaching is stripped away, what is revealed is not the phallus, but 
the prick, the "ridiculously impotent" poseur is all the more laughable for herlhis 
claim to the phallus" (ibidem). 
14 The democratization of pedagogic relationships exacerbates this already (structural) antagonism because 




















The phallus is always shadowed by its negative fonn, the prick. The prick is a designation given to 
a failed phallus. It is the appellation by which a mockery of presumptuous power is invoked. This is 
what must be repressed in order to maintain the original image of the teacher as source of desired 
knowledge and to restore the desirous gaze of the student. 
References to the phallus, the prick and oblique references to desire indicate a peculiar phenomenon 
in pedagogic relationships, namely, that it is attended by the dynamics of sexuality, for example, 
Aoki refers to this as "pedagogical sexualization" (op. cit.: 38 - 41). It is a widely accepted fact that 
sexual or romantic relationships between teachers and students occur within educational 
institutions. The institutional response is to mobilize policing to prevent such relationships or at 
least to prevent the potentially negative fallout. The mobilization is done through laws and codes of 
conduct regulating the relationships between teachers and students. The function of these laws and 
codes is that of "pedagogic castration" (ibid.). Teachers are required to relate to their students 
asexually. But the "good teacher ... is never really castrated; s/he only agrees to sustain the 
professional farce of pricklessness that allows the classroom to operate . . . [Together with the 
institution they] agree to act as if sexuality has been evicted from the classroom, when both sides 
know very well that such eviction is impossible" (Aoki 2002: 40). 
Institutional repression of the prick has also a more fundamentally psychoanalytic twist to it: it is 
only through the repression of the prick that the fantasy of the teacher may be sustained. Without 
fantasy at play, there is only the image of an imposter, or worse still, the image of a charlatan. And 
the fantasy sustains the gaze of the student. The student's gaze, however, is inevitably fractured 
because "the teacher is ultimately always a prick" (ibid.). To have a meaningful pedagogical 
presence for the student the teacher is structurally bound to be a prick. 
We may see how this is structurally detennined by an analysis of the social relationships in the 
classroom. In chapter 2 we have already seen that modalities of framing can draw out resistances 
from pupils. Such resistances show up within the pedagogic practices of pupils. Let us be reminded 
that framing is the regulation on the communicative context: it is about legitimate fonns of 
communication. It thus, necessarily, entails the display of delegated authority, primarily but not 
exhaustively, via the teacher's voice. Bernstein, read through a Lacanian lense, is therefore telling us 





















form of authority but that this concomitantly induces the response of resistances to this display of 
authority. The resistances, in tum, frustrate the fulfilment of the teacher's mandate of authority, 
reducing the phallus to a mere prick. 
We may see this in another way, with respect to the social division of labour. I have already stated 
that the classificatory principle entailed in the social division of labour sets up the category 
relationship 'teacher-pupil'. This is the dominant principle which organises social relations in the 
classroom. This in tum entails the endowment of the mandate to teach. I described this mandate via 
the illustration of the 'skeptron' and I have identified the skeptron as an image corresponding to the 
concept of the "phallus" in Lacan. Yet we know that no one ever possess the phallus. The status as 
holder of the phallus thus slides to the position of a failed phallus: the well-endowed teacher thus 
shows up as the prick. This slippage of status from phallus to prick is structurally determined by the 
principle of the social division of labour. 
3.3 Ayoiding the fallure. sustaining the fantasy? 
I have been describing hitherto the typical relation between teacher and pupil in which the teacher is 
the master of the subject. Bensusan and Shalem have produced an illuminating discussion on the 
mastery conception of pedagogy as well as its opposite in The Crooked Path of Pedagogy 
(Bensusan & Shalem 1994). 
They begin with a critique of a form of pedagogy referred to as "critical theory". This pedagogical 
form assumes the pedagogical master, but not in the traditional sense of the term. In the traditional 
sense of the master, the pedagogic mode is explicit. In the pedagogy which they critique the master 
engages in an implicit mode of pedagogy: guiding the student toward "enlightenment", 
"conversion", "liberation" and "Truth" (op cit.: 176). This theory proposes that students must first 
be allowed to express their desires, pleasures and frustrations for their lives in an uninhibited 
manner. The teacher then exploits this moment of trust to reflect the students' utterances back to 
them in a manner which reveals the inconsistencies or falsehoods in their beliefs which prevent the 
realisation of happiness hoped for in the original utterances. The authors' critique is two-fold: i) that 
the apologists for this pedagogy refuses "an explicit conception of truth, in the form of teachers' 
authority over knowledge" yet implicitly hold on to "an absolutist notion of Happiness" and ii) the 



















unresolved ''pedagogical problematic of getting the students to voluntarily relinquish volitions and 
wants and the likelihood of successfully achieving this" (op cit.: 177). 
The question which the authors seem to set themselves to answer is how these deadlocks in critical 
pedagogy might be overcome. The fIrst of these is a logical contradiction and so the resolution is 
simple: identify which one of the statements of critical theory should be saved and modify the other. 
This approach seems to have been adopted and is borne out by the assertion which they make later 
(op cit.: 180). 
They proceed to expound their answer to these questions by critiquing the negative form of the 
critical theorists notion of the master. 
In the alternative pedagogy, critiqued by the authors, the aim is to "undermine the reader's 
confIdence in 'knowledge' as something about which there ought to be a 'theory' and which has 
'foundations"'. Primary socialisation, according to this alternative, is about induction into the 
narratives of the community in which the child is reared. In later years in formal schooling, it is the 
"role of teacher . . . to help the student position herself (sic) in relation to these traditions" (op cit.: 
179). In this theory there is absolutely no master, for there is no truth to be mastered. The question 
posed to apologists of this theory is whether they can accommodate the "necessary constitutive 
agency ofloss in the pedagogical situation" (op cit.: 180). If all that is accomplished is a positioning 
of the student with respect to the plethora of traditions in the social, then can this be sufficient to 
make the judgement that 'education' has indeed taken place? The aspect of critical theory which 
Bensusan and Shalem aim to hold on to is that which sees pedagogy as entailing a sacrifIce on the 
part of the student in order to possess something more valuable. And it is this exchange that results 
in the 'education' of the subject. 
Bensusan and Shalem draw out an answer to the problems encountered in both critiques by drawing 
out the amiable features of each. In terms of the conception of a master, the authors assert that there 
is a truth which the teacher must hold out for the student to grasp; but in doing so, unlike the notion 





















In doing so, the authors have preserved the best of both theories in a manner which avoids the 
inconsistencies in each. Moreover, two important pedagogical dynamics are highlighted: i) the 
factor of loss as constitutive of genuine pedagogic processes, and ii) that a continuous deferral of 
the valued pedagogical object is constitutive of the students desire to change. 
This second point is the solution to the second impasse encountered in critical theory. "Staging 
desiring as such entails a process which maintains the desire alive by constructing a chain of 
gratification which is continuously elusive so that 'the subject cannot come alongside it'. For this to 
happen the object of desire ... has to be refused" (op cit.: 181). In short, "pedagogy. " functions 
by means of withholding rather than by means of transmission" (ibid). 




















CONCEPTUAL TOOLS TO SUPPORT THE ANALYSIS 
I will now discuss some important conceptual tools for my analysis of the pedagogic relation. We 
have already seen that the pedagogic relation may be fruitfully described in terms of Bernstein's 
concepts of classification and framing, and pedagogic code. In addition, the structural necessities of 
the pedagogic relation entail the factor of resistance offered by the student to the pedagogic 
communicative context. We have seen how Lacan's notions of real, symbolic and imaginary orders 
may be employed to produce a more precise description of the nature of the pedagogic relation. I 
will begin with a discussion of the notion of 'desire', mentioned in the previous chapter, in terms of 
the way it is understood in Lacanian thought. We will then refme our initial ideas of the pedagogic 
relation in terms of the notion of 'antagonism'. We will recruit the concepts of 'extimacy' and 
'procept' and the relational device of the semiotic square of opposition. A discussion of additional 
Lacanian terms will complete this chapter and enable us to take the analysis further. 
4.1 Desire. drive. the object. the Other and jouissance 
'Desire' is a concept we will encounter many times in this essay. Of all the Lacanian concepts, desire 
is probably the most central (Evans 2006: 36 - 39). It carries the idea of a perpetual force, 
motivating the trajectory of the subject's activity. Desire, unlike need, can never be satisfied; it is, in 
a sense, self-propagating. Need ceases at the point of its satisfaction; desire is the excess of demand 
over need, which, as Kojeve puts it, is "perfectly useless from the biological point of view" (ibid.: 
38). 
Two further points must briefly be mentioned here. The first is that Lacanian desire is always the 
Other's desire. This is the peculiarly social nature of desire. It is associated with a desire for 
recognition, and is always a desire from the point of view of the Other (the gaze) - desired objects 
are always those which have been learned to be the object of desire by an other. This is a reference 
to the foundational importance of the intervention of language on the subject, for it is through 
language that representations are made of desire and in terms of language that the subject becomes 
desirous of objects within the social-symbolic order. The object of desire is usually termed object 






















The second point is that desire is not the same as drive. Although they both carry the notion of 
motive force, the drives are the ''particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire" 
(Ibid.: 38). I will be using the concept of pedagogic desire and pedagogic drive in the sense that the 
pedagogic relation requires a pedagogic desire to maintain it, and that this pedagogic desire is 
manifested in the particular pedagogic drive which circulates around the production of the 
privileged text for a particular subject discipline or topic. 
In relation to object petit a, the object through which desire is maintained, the subject's relentless 
pursuit of that which seems desirable in the object is term jouissance. Jouissance is the pursuit of 
the desire beyond the pleasure principle. Evans observes that ''jouissance is suffering" (2006: 93) 
or, to draw out its paradoxical nature, it is the "suffering that [the subject] derives from his own 
satisfaction" (ibidem). This term is thus apt for use to describe the teacher's persistent 'struggle' with 
the student in pedagogic communication to 'get him to understand'. It also implicates a structure of 
repetition, about which we will have more to say in chapter 6. 
The term may also be used of the jouissance of the student. It is representative of both the resistance 
to knowledge as well as the struggle to reproduce the privileged text. It is because of its relation to 
the object of desire, thatjouissance may also be represented by the object petit a. 
4.2 Antagonjsm - Emesto Laclau and Chantal MoutIe 
Let me begin this short section by eliminating misconceptions. Antagonism is not the opposition of 
physical objects, nor is it the contradiction of concepts. In both cases it is the positivity of the 
objects or concepts that results in the particular relation of opposition or contradiction. Two 
examples will illustrate what I mean. 
In the first case, that of real opposition, we may think of a cricket ball and a cricket bat. It is the 
positive nature of both that permits, for example, a batsman to smash the ball over the boundary for 
a 'six'. The batsman would not be able to do so if, for example, the bowler used an object with very 
different physical properties, such as a table tennis ball, for example. The relation of the physical 
properties of a table tennis ball and cricket bat would not allow for the production of good cricket 15. 
15 I beg the indulgence of the reader in imagining that, assuming that an excellent bowler could deliver a table tennis 




















We would not, in the case of the relation between a cricked bat striking a cricket ball, speak of an 
antagonistic relation existing between them. This is a case of real opposition: the nature of two 
physical objects give rise to a determinable outcome when they are brought into relation with each 
other. 
Let us continue with our illustrations from cricket when considering the second case, that of 
conceptual contradiction. Suppose one of the batsmen is involved in a 'run out' situation: the ball is 
struck; the batsmen run; the ball is returned to a fielding member who knocks the bails of the 
wickets as a batsman crosses the crease. The fielding team appeals to the umpires for a run out. The 
affected batsmen believes that the crease was crossed in time to have negated the conditions for 'run 
out', or phrased positively, to have fulfilled the conditions for 'not-being-run-out'. The conditions 
'run out' and 'not-being-run-out' are mutually exclusive and are defined by the Laws of Cricket. In 
making their decision, the umpires must refer to the Laws in order to decide whether or not a 'run 
out' should be given. The concept of a run out is well defmed in the Laws so that the states of being 
run out and 'not-being-run-out' can not logically exist simultaneously, that is, 'run out' and 'not-
being-run-out' stand in conceptual contradiction to each other. It would be ridiculous to assert that if 
the conditions for 'run out' are met, and the umpire declares that the batsman is run out, that this 
represents an antagonism in the relation between player and umpire, or an antagonism in the 
relation between the two teams. 
But it is a completely different case if a selector overlooks a good cricket player for selection to 
play in a team. Here, we may justifiably assert that there is an element of antagonism in the relation 
between selector and player. For the feature that marks this relation is that a subject (the cricket 
player) is prevented from actually being a cricket player by being overlooked for selection into a 
team. For a subject to be fully constituted as a cricket player, the subject must play cricket in a 
recognised game of cricket. In my example, this state of actualisation of the potential cricket player 
is disrupted by the influence of an Other (the selector). We have the relation of antagonism when 
the entelechy of the subject is frustrated by an Other. In one sense, an antagonism is a negation of 
the fulfilment of 'being' by the relational presence of another being (refer, for example, Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 122 - 127). 
Antagonism is that feature of the pedagogic relation that I wish to single out as the disruption of 




















pedagogic discourse through the disruption of pedagogic communication. A more precise definition 
of antagonism may not be offered because "every language and every society are constituted as a 
repression of the consciousness of the impossibility that penetrates them. Antagonism escapes the 
possibility of being apprehended through language, since language only exists as an attempt to fix 
that which antagonism subverts (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 125). In the light of the illustration 
provided above, we may regard the category relation 'teacher-pupil' as entailing an antagonism just 
as much as it is entailed in an antagonism. It is a structural necessity of the pedagogic relation that 
ii the category 'teacher' entails the very presence which frustrates the entelechy of the 'teacher'. 
The teacher is always a prick precisely because the mandate of power and knowledge is never 
completely actualised in the practice of teaching. There is always something of the student which 
escapes transmission-acquisition under the teacher's mandate; always something which prevents the 
teacher from being a 'complete' teacher in terms of the symbolic mandate. Teaching is a sequence of 
pedagogic practices enacted by the teacher in order to regulate the student to know and to do what 
the teacher wants. The designation 'teacher' is both a category and a function. It is a category in the 
social division of labour of the classroom which entails the function of pedagogic communication. 
This understanding has similarities to the notion ofa "procept" in Gray & Tall (1994). The teacher's 
job is to confront the informally socialised nature of the student - the student-as-ignorant, the 
student-as-void of legitimate knowledge - and to persuade the student to reproduce the selected 
formal knowledge, instead of the other knowledge, in appropriate ways. But this function of the 
teacher meets with resistance from the student, a state of affairs which we here label as antagonism. 
Antagonisms exist at the limit of attempts at complete transmission-acquisition: it exists as a feature 
which seems as much an intrinsic property of pedagogic communication as it is an extrinsic witness 
to the failed attempts at its complete efficacy. 
4.3 Extimacy (,Extimite) - JacQue-Allain Miller 
This curious location of antagonism - at the limit of discourse, seemingly both internal and external 
to the discourse - is most aptly represented by the Lacanian notion of extimacy. 
Lacan coined the term extimite (translated as 'extimacy') to name a peculiar feature of the subject. In 
attempting to describe the most intimate region of the subject, it was observed that this "central 






































































place" had the quality of an "intimate exteriority", a quality for which Lacan coined the term 
"extimacy" (Lacan 1986: 139). Jacque-Allain Miller, as a student of Lacan, a participant in his 
Seminars, and a practising psychoanalyst, has set himself the task to "transform this term into an 
, articulation, a structure" by which he intends to clarify its meanings (Miller 1994: 74). It is a 
"' 
polyvalent term. Miller shows the various contexts for its application, and my discussion of the term 
is drawn from those applications. 
lr t We begin by noting with Miller that "extimacy is not the contrary of intimacy. Extimacy says that 
the intimate is Other - like a foreign body, a parasite" (ibid.: 76). The foremost image we may 
present here, is that of the analyst in psychoanalysis. The analyst relates to the analysand at the most 
intimate level. As such, the position of the analyst is at the centre of the subject under 
psychoanalysis. Yet the analyst, to be an effective analyst, must always affect this position of 
intimacy from the outside - precisely as an intruder who has no personal interest in the analysand. 
The relation of analyst to analysand is extimate to the intimacy which the relation entails (ibid.: 77). 
~i. There is an equivalent relation of subject to the unconscious - ''the unconscious is the Other's 




The structure of the pedagogic relation has this quality of extimacy. This is reflected in a curious 
statement by Bernstein: "If the culture of the teacher is to become the consciousness of the child, 
then the culture of the child must fIrst be in the consciousness of the teacher" (Bernstein 1971: 65). 
Whatever else this may mean, it certainly signifIes a structural prerequisite of the pedagogic relation 
necessary for effective transmission-acquisition. The concept of extimacy names this observation by 
Bernstein. However, it is precisely because of this structural necessity that things tum out to be not 
that simple. What Bernstein names as "culture" is the particular articulation of specialised 
knowledge and everyday knowledge '6 which informs the pedagogic transmissions of the teacher. It 
is the teacher's relay of pedagogic discourse. Now pedagogic discourse is brought into relation with 
the pedagogic subject (the 'child'), which entails local and official pedagogic practices according to 
the fIgure shown in §2.2, pagel7. And the local and pedagogic practices are precisely the substance 
of what Bernstein names as 'culture'. 
Now the nature of the interaction of these two 'cultures' is such that the presence of one forecloses 
16 In the colloquialisms of education, these two fonns of knowledge are usually referred to as 'knowledge, skills, and 
values'. 





































Ii,:,' " i 
: ~. 
the possibility of the other's complete constitution. This is the structure of 'antagonism' and it is 
precisely this impasse that 'teaching strategies', and "cultural-responsive pedagogies", etc., aim to 
address. Thus we have in Bernstein the reference to an extimate relation of teacher and pupil which 
also signifies a necessary relation of antagonism. 
I would like to round off this discussion on extimacy by including an analogical reference often 
associated with it. The nature of the pedagogic relationship is not a simple linear relation of 
transmission-acquisition. If there were a topological analogue of the pedagogic relation, it would be 
more like the Mobius band, which at first glance may appear to have two separate sides, but which 
actually has only one. In a similar way, the position of antagonism may appear at first glance to 
exist within the pedagogic relation until we see that antagonism exists as the limit to its complete 
constitution - as that which remains, as a negative presence, after the positivity of pedagogic 
communication is rendered incomplete by the resistant presence of the student. Antagonism 
therefore stands in an extimate relation to the intimacy of the pedagogic relation. 
4.4 Antalonjsm. extimaty and procept 
I have mentioned that the category 'teacher' has similarities to the notion of a "procept" (Gray & 
Tall 1994). The term is employed to describe the nature of some mathematical symbols which 
signify a concept as well as a particular mathematical procedure. 'Teacher' is an identity - a concept 
- that only finds complete constitution in the practices and procedures of teaching. The notion of 
'teacher' may thus be understood to have a proceptual nature. It is due to the proceptual nature of 
'teacher' that it is impossible to think of what is entailed in the notion of a 'teacher' without 
simultaneously having a concept of 'student' in mind. 'Teacher' as categorical identity is 
primordially attached to the notion of 'student', bearer of the voice of ignorance and submission. 
And if we consider the teacher's 'function' to be an enabler of transmission-acquisition, it is the 
student's 'function' to resist it. 
We therefore arrive at the conclusion that 'student' is entailed in the identity of 'teacher', and hence, 
via an alternate route, at the corollary that the category 'student', as the agent of antagonism, stands 




















4.5.1 Semiotic square of opposition - A1mdas Greimas 
I would now like to engage specifically with the aspect of 'process' in transmission-acquisition as 
found in Bernstein. Bernstein's basic assumption is that of a linear process of transmission-
acquisition, which entails aspects I would like to discuss below. 
Transmitter ~ Acquirer 
(ll1ustration 2: The Basic Model of Pedagogic Communication) 
Education, and in particular the pedagogic relationship, entails communication of a specialised kind 
(Bernstein 2000: 26 - 27). Bernstein's focus was on the search for "general principles underlying 
the transformation of knowledge into pedagogic communication" (Bernstein 1996: 39). The 
pedagogic device explains how the "interactional and structural relations" of these educational 
transmissions are formed, at various levels of the social, in terms of the Distributive Rule, the 
Recontextualising Rule, and the Evaluative Rule (Bernstein 2000: 91; Bernstein 1990: 190). This is 
the mechanism for the coding of the distribution of power and social regulation into educational 
transmissions (Bernstein 1975: 178). At the interactional level of classroom practice, the 
Recontextualising Rule is the principle according to which pedagogic discourse embeds the 
instructional discourse in the regulative discourse. Bernstein's theory also emphasises that it is the 
nature of educational transmissions to undergo transformations at various levels of the education 
system, from the macro-level of the social - political and economic - to the micro-level of the 
classroom - transmission from teachers to students (Bernstein 1990: 173, refer to diagram on page 
17, §2.2). 
This summary of Bernstein on pedagogic communication, taken together with Bernstein's 
"postulate" that "between power and knowledge, and knowledge and forms of consciousness, is 
i always the pedagogic device (PD)"(Bernstein 1990: 181, italics in original), leads to the following 



































(Illustration 3: Pedagogic Communication Structured by the Pedagogic Device) 
The diagram is explained below. 
The pedagogic device is the cornerstone, holding the structure together. Yet the relation 
'Transmitter ~ Acquirer' is framed to show that, at the level of the immediate, what we experience 
is simply the pedagogic communication as an index to the dynamics of the pedagogic relationship. 
In the 'background', so to speak, is the function of the pedagogic device operating between 'Power' 
and 'Knowledge', and 'Knowledge' and various forms of consciousness ('~Consciousness'). I would 
like to assert that this model represents Bernstein's basic conceptualisation with respect to 
pedagogic communication; and that, at the interactional level between teacher and student in the 
classroom, it is in this model that the traditional schema of communication is posited as operative. 
This model, however, suggests that the message is transmitted and received clearly and without 
interference or resistance by the acquirer. It implies the notion of 'full' communication, which has 
the status of a "moral ought-to-be" (Davis 2004: 47). Of course the message (the transmission) may 
be distorted in favour of privileged and privileging orientations to meaning, etc. We take cognisance 
of the fact that Bernstein's emphasis is on the message and the means of its transformation, through 
the 'carrier' of the pedagogic device, and its consequential shaping of the acquirer's conscience and 
consciousness for the reproduction of social structure. But this is precisely what I wish to highlight 
in Bernstein's model: that the emphasis is on the production and transformation of the message as 
such, while the transmitter and acquirer exist merely by implication of the existence of the message 






















Greimas provides an alternative model for communication theory in terms of his discourse on 
semiotics. He refers to the shift away from this traditional model, to an alternate modelling of 
communication, as: 
"the modalization of communication theory [ ... in which we posit the replacement of] the 
traditional schema with a sender, a receiver, and a message, [with an alternative:] two 
interacting, modally competent subjects facing each other [ ... ]. Each of these subjects, 
whether enagaged in conversation or arguing [ ... ] has its own proper trajectory [ ... ] its own 
historicity [ ... ] its own modal history [ ... ]. Their meeting brings about a sort of polemic, a 
struggle between two competences, and the structure of struggle can take the form of what 
we have called the polemical-contractual. In other words, we are dealing with continuous 
tension between primitive confrontation or contractuality [ ... ]. Yet it should be added that 
there is never a detlnitive struggle [ ... ] for in the narrative schema there exist a subject 
and an antisubject in a permanent conflictual situation. 
(Greimas, Perron & Collins 1989: 549, emphases added) 
Here we fmd descriptiQns of communication in which the definitive feature is that of an 
antagonism: "Each ... subject[] ... has its own proper trajectory ... the structure of struggle ... [in 
which] there exist a subject and an antisubject in [a] permanent conflictual situation". 
This description adequately represents, at a fundamental level, the nature of the interaction in the 
pedagogic relationship. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have elaborated on the "continuous tension", in 
which there is ''never a definitive struggle" between "a subject and an antisubject in a permanent 
conflictual situation", in their treatment of the notion "antagonism", discussed earlier in this essay. 
Using Greima's terms, we may then transform the initial representation of pedagogic 
communication as a uni-directional transmission-acquisition into a bi-directional, recursive relation 
of antagonism. 
Subject .... • Antisubject 
(Teacher I Student) (Teacher I Student) 
(lllustration 4: Pedagogic Communication Structured by Recursion and Antagonism) 
Greimas therefore provides the theoretical context within which to embellish Bernstein's model of 
pedagogic communication, with a view to focus on the antagonistic potential inherent in the 
pedagogic relationship. I will briefly elaborate on the features of value in this model before moving 




















We will start by noting that the bi-directional arrow represents Greimas' assertion that in the 
modalization of communication, each subject has their "own proper trajectory", their own proper 
aims in the pedagogic relation. Therefore, when viewed from either position, the Other always 
appears as the antisubject, thwarting the aims of the subject through the presence of the Other's 
aims. 
Consider, for example, the aim of a mathematics teacher in any particular lesson. The main aim is to 
communicate concepts about relations between, and operations on, mathematically defined objects 
(numbers, algebra, measures of space and time, etc.). In the traditional model the teacher's aim is 
the communication of mathematical knowledge. But Bernstein reminds us that the discourse of 
instruction is embedded in a discourse of regulation. And what is this regulation all about? The 
regulation functions in two ways: i) to transmit recognition and realisation criteria; and ii) to 
regulate the students' behaviour - that is, the social order of the classroom. In other words, there is 
regulation related to the ( acceptable) reproduction of mathematical knowledge and there is 
regulation related to social relations. Here we should pause to consider the question: 'Why should 
the regulation of something of no immediate importance to mathematics - that is, the regulation of 
social order - be an indispensable factor in the pedagogic discouse of a mathematics teacher - in 
fact, for the teacher of any subject'? The answer can not be found in Bernstein's model of pedagogic 
communication, in which transmission-acquisition is the focus of the model. We do, however, have 
access to an answer to this question if we refer to Greimas' modalization theory of communication 
in which each of the subjects "has its own proper trajectory [ ... ] . [A] struggle between two 
competences, and the structure of struggle can take the form of what we have called the 
polemical-contractual. In other words, we are dealing with continuous tension ... " (Greimas: 
loco cit. Bold added). In addition to the teacher's pedagogic aims and intended trajectory for the 
lesson, the student has an independent set of aims and a personal trajectory during the lesson. This 
sets up the antagonism - the simultaneous presence of alternative aims of both teacher and taught. 
And this is why we can not think of pedagogic communication simply as a transmission-acquisition 
1f from teacher to student. Both are inextricably caught up in the ''polemical-contractual''. 
~ Greimas' modaUzation theory of communication 




















grew out of the field of inquiry into semiotics and were based on the pervading ideas of the time 
about the nature of the sign. These ideas are generally grouped as belonging to the field of 
structuralism. By reference to concepts developed by Jakobson apropos of the phonological 
signifier, Greimas developed the notions of the syntagm and the paradigm. The syntagm is the 
elemental semantic unit, and the paradigm is the structured network of syntagms which constitute a 
meaningful production of the next level of syntagms (Katilius-Boydstun 1990: loe. cit.). The 
general trajectory of semantic production is "from the simple to the complex, from the general to 
the particular, . . . through a number of determinisms . . . from immanence to manifestation" 
(Greimas & Rastier 1968: 86 - 87); a recursive process in which each succeeding semantic product 
depends on its antecedent. The structuralist notions of synchrony, difference, and levels form the 
basis of these concepts (Katilius-Boydstun 1990). In these terms, we may then think about 
communication as an exchange of semantic units between a minimum of two sentient, responsive, 
beings. Greimas' 'modalization theory' introduces the additional degree of subtlety required to 
conceptualise the effect of communication on the participants. 
In modalization theory, Greimas' considers communication as ''the language act, or enunciation, 
attempting to outline the means by which semiotic possibilities are transformed into real words with 
real consequences"(Katilius-Boydstun 1990). The process of semantic production entails the 
origination of semantic possibilites in a (hidden) simple paradigmatic structure which culminates in 
manifested form via a series of transformations. The semantic potential of the paradigm is, so to 
speak, 'materialised' via the transformations. These transformations occur recursively at various 
levels of semantic production. Greimas explains: 
Take a trivial exampl~you have just seen a movie and you are asked to describe it. In 
answer to such a question some very simple ideas, which serve as a scheme, will come into 
your mind, organizing your memorized knowledge; only then will you articulate your 
memories in sequences and utterances. That is exactly the way I see the generation of 
discourse. 
(Discussing Language, ed. Herman Parrett, The Hague: Mouton, 1974: 56. quoted in 
Katilius-Boydstun 1990: loc. cit.) 
Greimas provides a method of formerly organising the relationship between first-level semantic 
units (syntagms) and the paradigm therewith constituted, which consequently facilitates the 
production of higher level syntagms: the "semiotic square organizes the possibilites of 




















in actual communication" (Katilius-Boydstun 1990: loc. cit.). 
Greimas developed the semiotic square as the "elementary structure of signification" (Greimas 
1968: 87; Greimas 1989: 539; see also Davis 2005a: 154ff. & 233ff.)17. The "possibilities" exist in 
the semiotic square as pure potentialities of meaning - 'place-holders', so to speak, for signifiers "as 
they appear in actual communication". Moreover, this elementary structure of signification may be 
thought of as being structured, at least initially, in terms of the sign as a binary signifier: consisting 
of a positive semantic element and a contrary, against which it is contrasted. The difference between 
the two is the essential feature which imbues both with meaning. This relationship may be 
represented as: 
.. 1 __ 1i_erm_ A_ .... 1 ................. ~ .. 1__ 1i_erm_B_ .... 1 
This is the initial binary structure, representing a a relationship of contrariety. From this initial 
binary contrarian relationship, we may derive two additional contradictory terms, each being the 
logical negation of the contrarian terms. In Greimas' formulation, each of the contradictories form a 
relation of "simple implication" with one of the initial contrarian terms, giving the following 
structural relation: 
.. 1__ 1i_e_rm_A_ .... I .................. ~ .. 1__ 1i_e_m_l B_ ..... I 
.1_OO_ll-_1i_e_rm_B_ .. I .................. ~ .1_OO_ll-_1i_e_rm_A_ .. 1 
Following Greimas (1968: 88) the dotted lines represent the relations of contrariety and the 
continuous lines represent the relations of contradiction. The relations of simple implication are 
such that non-Term B implies Term A, but not the inverse; and similarly, non-Term A implies Term 































































B, but not the inverse. 
Structurally, we may derive the following binary signifiers: 
• Term A I Term B = 'Complex axis' (contrariety) 
• not-Term A I not-Term B = 'Neutral axis' (contrariety) 
• Term A I not-Term A = 'Schema A' (contradiction) 
• Term B I not-Term B = 'Schema B' (contradiction) 
• not-Term B I Term A = 'Deixis not-Term B' (simple implication) 
• not-Term A I Term B = 'Deixis_not-Term A' (simple implication) 
We may thus complete the semiotic square by filling in its structural components, each of which is a 
binary signifier: 
COIq>lex_ aD 
Term A 4111·············111- TermB 
~ ~ 
@ ~: 




~ non-TermB non-Term A > 4111·············111-
Neutral aD 
(Illustration 5: A Greimasian Semiotic Square) 
Let us now apply these to the argument. In the pedagogic relation, the primary actants stand in 
relation to each other in a manner analogous to the initial binary signifier. We may therefore 
propose that the pedagogic relation has the nature of a binary signifier comprised of the semantic 
elements 'Teacher' and 'Student'. By reference to Greimas' elementary structure of signification, we 




















relation, which in tum forms the pedagogic text: 
Categories I Actants = Category Relation I Signifier Relation type 
Teacher I Student = 'Pedagogic Jelation' (contrariety) 
non-Teacher I non-Student = 'non-Pedagogic relation' (contrariety) 
Teacher I non-Teacher = 'Schema Teacher' (contradiction) 
Student I non-Student = 'Schema Student' (contradiction) 
non-Student I Teacher = 'Deixis non-Student' (simple implication) 
non-Teacher I Student = 'Deixis non-Teacher' (simple implication) 






















In pedagogic communication we find all the features of signification as described by Greimas. The 
actants are themselves also signifying units (syntagms) which form the initial binary signifier of the 
semiotic square. The pedagogic relationship is the paradigm structuring the syntagms as a 
contrarian pair of binary signifiers: the subject and the antisubject of a modalized communication 
theory. The pure potentialities of meaning of the initial binary signifier are thus realised in 




















We now need to develop these potentialities of meaning into more useful concepts amenable to 
theoretical and empirical investigation. The theoretical resources that I will use to develop the 
meaning of the Greimasian semiotic square for pedagogy are those of Lacan (1991) with additional 
assistance from Davis (2005a: 61 - 80 & 233 - 236) and Davis (2003). We take our queue, 





















TIlE DISCOURSES OF TIlE PEDAGOGIC RELATION: BERNSTEIN avec LACAN 
S.1 Eyaluation and the acquisition of the Other's voice 
The basic Bernsteinian structure of the pedagogic relation is that of a transmitter, an acquirer, and 
the message between them. The goal of this interaction is to transmit the recognition and realisation 
rules of the privileged text. This implicates the evaluation rule as the regulation over textual 
transmissions and reproductions. The "key to pedagogic practice is continous evaluation" because 
the ''fundamental message of a pedagogic practice is the rule for legitimate communication and 
hence it is evaluation which condenses the meaning of the pedagogic device (Bernstein 1990: 186, 
34,187, italics in original; Davis 2004: 51). The constant regulation on the production of the 
legitimate text in tum results in the transmission-acquisition of the principles of classification and 
framing and the reproduction of categories in terms of the distribution of power. 
Bernstein states the connection between this fundamental function of the pedagogic device, that is, 
acquiring the classification, and the Lacanian notion of desire, in a seminary address in 1994: 
Now so far we've just looked at relationships between, which give us category relationships and 
from that we go to classification. If you like, the secret of the classification is invisible, because it's 
the insulation - that takes us to power, and the policing, of the principle, if you break it. As you 
acquire the classification you acquire the voice of the other and therefore there's always the 
potential for dis. . . dis- disorder. It's at this level that the thesis connects with psychoanalysis. If 
you want to take it that way. At one time I was going to connect it with Lacan, but then I decided 
no because then he wrote poetry. [ ... Lacanian psychoanalysis is not built on clinical practice - an 
empirical basis] Okay, so, where are we? Oh yes, so that's how it connects. And that's how you get 
desire in the theory. So when people say there's no desire in the theory its simply because they 
don't understand it - or they don't want to understand it - or it doesn't look as though you can do it 
because ... these are all very formal ... ah ... what ... these are all very formal derivations. But 
they're empirical. And when I say the voice of the other is there, that is a matter for empirical 
investigation. (Bernstein 1994: Session of Thesday, 1 November; transcribed and quoted in Davis 
(2005a» 
In this excerpt we see that the acquisition of the classification entails the acquisition of the Other's 
voice and that this results in the potential for disorder l8• This instance of Bernstein's theory indexes 
''that point of indeterminacy [in the pedagogic relation] which is the ignorance qua illicit enjoyment 
(jouissance) of the student. Lacan would say that pedagogy stumbles against the student" (Davis 



















2004: 54 - 55). Bernstein has asserted that "it's at this level that the thesis connects with 
psychoanalysis ... [and] that's how you get desire in the theory" (Bernstein 1994). He has also 
asserted that the " 'voice' is constituted by the pedagogic device" (Bernstein 1990: 190). It is the 
pedagogic device which acts as a relay for the distribution of power and its principles of 
classification, and hence also as a relay of the 'voice' of the Other (refer figure 4.1). We thus have a 
relation between 'voice', the pedagogic device, pedagogic discourse, knowledge and desire. 
5.2 The Other's voice & the hysteric's discoune 
If these entities are related in pedagogic communication, what is it, then, that activates the relation 
at the interactional level of pedagogic communication in the classroom for the reproduction to take 
place? What sets the communication in motion and provides its impetus and momentum? 
While it may be gratifying to think that the impetus lies in desire for knowledge l9, Lacan supplies us 
with a different answer: it is not desire that leads to knowledge - that which leads to knowledge is 
the hysteric's discourse (Lacan 1991: 23). Reproductions of the privileged text occurs when the 
discourse of the hysteric regulates the pedagogic relation. We may read this as a direct consequence 
of the acquisition of the Other's voice. Acquiring the 'voice' means also to identify with the desire of 
the Other. This is another sense in which " ... man's desire is the Other's desire", a "formula that 
originated in the experience of the hysteric" (Lacan 1981: 38; see also Lacan 1999: 525; see also 
Zizek 1991: 108; Bailly 2009: 110 - 111). It is the Other's desire that constitutes the distributive rule, 
which in tum structures pedagogic communication because of its hierarchical relation to the rules of 
evaluation. This is expounded by Davis (2004): 
... when considering pedagogic relations and the operation of the evaluative rule of the pedagogic 
device we should bear in mind that the activity of the student is dominated by a concern with 
recognition and realization rules: 'What must I do? How can I achieve what has been demanded of 
me?' This insistent questioning by the student, whether verbalized or not, is nothing if not an index 
of a necessary point of ignorance in the pedagogic relation and, in that sense, it is also an index of 
a point of resistance to the reproduction of knowledge - even when the subjective orientation of 
the student is one of not wanting to resist. In other words, the student desperately and continuously 
strives to overcome the dehiscence central to his or her relation to knowledge and is forced to 
address the teacher or field of knowledge in that regard. Structurally, the position of the student 
may therefore be described as one that continuously confronts the teacher and the field of 
knowledge with the question 'Why ... 1' (Why am I what you say I am? Why are things the way 
they are?). (Davis 2004: 52) 
19 Gratification would be derived here from the narcissism of the teacher: the knowledge desired is the teacher's 




















The quote above is a description of the hysteric's discourse: the insistent questioning of the student, 
which circulates around the (ontological) question of the student's identity in relation to the teacher 
and the educational system. The Hysteric's discourse emerges when the student is confronted with 
the irresistible desire of the teacher as Other. We see this in the questions quoted by Davis, which 
are concerned with the 'what' and the 'how' of the student's classroom reproductions and social 
relation to the teacher. When regulated by the Hysteric's discourse, the object around which the 
student's pedagogic drive circulates is that of acquiring an identity which reflects the teacher's 
desire. 
We may integrate these assertions in the following way. Acquisition of the classification is the 
Bernsteinian correlative to the Lacanian concept of alienation. In alienation we have the institution 
of the symbolic order in the subject through a forced choice. In Lacanian terms the choice is 
between acceptance or rejection of the symbolic order, that is, the symbolic order as the social-
symbolic with its entailed identities. This may be rephrased in Bernsteinian terms as a choice 
between the acceptance or rejection of the classification. And Lacan's point is that it is a forced 
choice: in acquiring the 'voice' of the Other, the subject must choose classification (alienation) as a 
necessary condition for his coming-to-be in the social-symbolic space of the pedagogic relation20• 
But there is a price to pay in this exchange entailed in the pedagogic relation - and it is analogous to 
the price paid by all of us as partakers in the social-symbolic (Zupancic 2003 : 174). For, to be a 
member of 'society', is to identify with the meanings immanently and irresistibly available in 
language - that is, the language learnt, not innate. The primordial importance of language is 
asserted by Lacan in statements such as the "signifier is the first mark of the subject" (Lacan 1981: 
62). To be human is to imbibe the language21 of the Other, and this entails being confronted with 
pre-existing meanings - meanings which relay the desire of the Other. Yet we have no choice but to 
accept these meanings for it is the means by which our identities are constituted in the social. We 
are thereby interpellated in the Other's desire. It is a forced choice between the constitution of 
positive, predicative being and the absence thereof, the presence of an unformed entity which may 
be referred to as a 'not-nothingness' (Lacan 1981: 63 - 64). The student who fails to choose the 
acquisition of the Other's voice 'shows up in the system' as deviant and steps are taken either to 
induce obeisance or to eject the student from the system. To acquire the Other's voice means 
20 As well as in the other social-symbolic spaces of ' society'. 





















constitution as a being within the social-symbolic economy of pedagogy; to reject such acquisition 
means a failure at the attempt to constitute an identity in the social-symbolic order. There is a sense 
of sacrifice to be made on the part of the student in order to be registered positively in the social-
symbolic space of pedagogy. It involves the displacement of the student's jouissance with that of the 
teacher's object petit a. In this sense, it is the teacher's 'enjoyment' - the teacher's knowledge -
which is the extimite kernel of the student. And there is a sense of an 'ought-to-be' in this: it is this 
exchange which constitutes the regulative discourse of pedagogy. 
Davis (2005a) has provided a detailed description of this exchange. The student must give up 
hislher object of desire in exchange for the one offered in the pedagogic relation. In accepting this 
exchange, the student is interpellated as subject of ignorance while simultaneously acquiring the 
classification. The reader is reminded here that Bernstein has stated that this entails the acquisition 
of the Other's desire, because the symbolic order is the order of the Other. In the pedagogic context 
acquisition of the Other's desire is acquisition of the principles of classification and classificatory 
relations. In Bernstein it is the strength of the classification which determines pedagogic identities. 
In other words, the acquirer's social-symbolic representations are configured to recognise, realise 
~;; and accept specific, legitimate identities. 
5.3 Identification 
Lacan states explicitly that identification is always that of a subject seeing its reflection in an object. 
This is most lucidly exemplified in Lacan's Schema L: 
S ______ -,a 
a' ~-------A 
(Illustration 7: A reproduction of"L Schema", Lacan 1999: 458) 




















Psychosis" (Lacan 1999: 445 - 488). Again, we should recall that Lacan's concepts were developed 
originally for psychoanalytic treatment in the clinic. But his concepts also have a broad 
philosophical underpinning as well as borrowing heavily from the field of linguistics (Lacan 1981: 
21; Evans 2006: 104, 146 - 147). Lacan's concepts, therefore, have an inherent potential of being 
developed in the broad directions of its supporting paradigms: Hegelian philosophy and structural 
linguistics. It is in reading Lacan with a linguistic and philosophical slant that the concepts in these 
fields become amenable to their application in the analysis of pedagogy. It is with these thoughts in 
mind that I would like to suggest that the relations between subject, object and Other contained in 
the schema could serve as an appurtenance for the description of the pedagogic relation with respect 
to the student, knowledge and the teacher. 
The schema is given as a topology of relations between the subject (S), the object (a), the subject's 
identification in the object (a1 and the Other (A). The topology "signifies that the condition of the 
subject, S ... depends on what unfolds in the Other, N' and that what "unfolds there is articulated 
like a discourse (the unconscious is the Other's discourse)" (op. cit.: 458 - 459). The presence of the 
Other in the subject is another case of an extimate relation, the structure of which is captured in the 
Lacanian aphorism, "the unconscious is the Other's discourse" (op. cit.: 459). Lacan proceeds to 
define the four corners of L Schema in the following words, in terms of which we may see the 
relation of the subject's desire to his or her objects: " ... S, his ineffable and stupid existence; a his 
objects; a', his ego, that is, his form as reflected in his objects; and A, the locus from which the 
question of his existence may arise for him" (ibidem). 
The notion that identification and identity formation occurs as a function of the subject being caught 
up in the discourse of the Other may be found in Bernstein's earliest work, for example, the 
following statements: "The problem [of the relation between social structure, forms of speech, and 
the subsequent regulation of behaviour] requires specification of the sociological processes which 




















"I shall argue that different speech systems or codes create for their speakers 
different orders of relevance and relation . . . As the child learns his 
speech ... [that is] codes which regulate his verbal acts, he learns the 
requirements of his social structure . . . the social structure becomes . .. the 
sub-stratum of the child's experience essentially through the 11ItIni/old 
consequence (sic) of the linguistic process. From this point of view every 
time the child speaks or listens, the social structure is reinforced in him and 
his social identity shaped. The social structure becomes the child's 
psychological reality through the shaping of his acts of speech." 
(Bernstein 1971: 144, emphases added) 
When I stated in §5.1, following Bernstein, that it is the acquisition of the classification that entails 
the acquisition of the Other's voice and that, in elaborating on the potential of this statement, we 
have a relation between 'voice', the pedagogic device, pedagogic discourse, knowledge and desire, I 
am referring to a dynamic in the pedagogic relation that is aptly captured by the L Schema. This 
dynamic is that of the interpellation of the student. In terms of the L Schema, we may define 
interplellation as that instance when there is identification in the discourse of the Other. In 
pedagogy, this occurs when the student recognises himself in pedagogic discourse and responds by 
becoming that subject of a lack of knowledge as required by the discourse, in order to learn what 
the teacher has to offer. It is this status of the student at the point of identification which produces 
the question, "What do you want me to do?" and "How do you want me to do it?". These questions 
are, respectively, the conjugates of identification with the instructional and regulative discourses. 
In the pedagogic relation, the teacher is the Other of the student and that which unfolds in the Other 
is pedagogic discourse as the voice of the Other. The objects made available for identification are 
the knowledge objects of the instructional and regulative discourses. 
I have said that L Schema allows us to see the subject's relation to the objects and desire: and in 
particular, the relation of the student, knowledge and the teacher. This assertion may be supported 
with reference to Bernstein's assertion that it is the acquisition of the Other's voice through which 
the student acquires the classification. In terms L Schema, the student (S) is confronted with a 
calling into question of his existence through the particularity of the teacher. It touches the student 
at the fundamental level of the meaning of existence, "not of the subject's place in the world, but of 
his existence as a subject, a calling into question which, ... will extend to his within-the-world 
. , relation to objects, and to the existence of the world, insofar as its existence, too, can be called into 




















discourse which is prior to the question of pedagogic relation, seeking an answer to the question, 
"What am I there?" (op. cit.: 459). 
Acquiring the classification, therefore, features as an answer to this relentless question. For it means 
! the acquisition of an identity in the discourse of the Other. In pedagogy, the teacher relays 
knowledge (a) as well as orientations to knowledge (a~ in terms of which the student is 
i (seductively) offered the possibility of acquiring an identity which will fill out the "What" in "What 
am I here?". The "What" consists of predicates concerning the student's basic identity, such as, sex, 
age, academic ability and deportment. The student's self-image is the aggregated fusion of these 
disparate predicates reflected back to the student in his or her social relations with peers, family, 
teacher, etc., by which they are seen as a whole and form the ego. The "What" holds out these 
predicates to the student as potentialities of meaning. This is partially what is entailed in the 
acquisition of the Other's voice. 
But this acquired identity, in the pedagogic relation, has a built in trap. For, in addition to the basic 
predicates of "What", the identity also includes the notion of the student as a point of absence of 
knowledge; knowledge being the very object essential to the fulfilment of the potential meanings 
held out by the acquisition of the classification. Pedagogic knowledge is about the specificity of the 
"What" which regulates the relation of the student to the categories of the classification22 • We will 
see later that the discourse of the hysteric crops up again in this regard, but this time in relation to 
the acquisition of knowledge. 
5.4 Identification and the hysteric's discourse 
i 
i Ii The identity to be acquired by the student in pedagogy is that of 'subject of ignorance' - the subject 
~~ who holds the place of a lack of knowledge. Now this identity is structured around a lack, a lack of a 
legitimate object, and consequently an impasse of identification. This state of the pedagogic subject 
may be represented in two questions: "What ought I to possess as a legitimate object?" and its 
entailed subaltern "Who am I?". Zizek, reading Lacan, states that this is the question of the hysteric 
(Zizek 1991: 156). This allows us to form a relation between the acquisition of the Other's voice in 
Bernstein with the four discourses of the social bond in Lacan. The hysteric's discourse is one of the 
22 According to Lacan, psychoanalysis "posits itself as modulating in a more radical way this relation of man to the 
world that has always been regarded as knowledge" (Lacan 1981: 63). 



















four, and is represented by the following Lacanian formula: 
(Illustration 8: The Discourse of the Hysteric) 
Lacan makes the following observation with regard to knowledge and the hysteric' discourse: 
"If there is one thing that psychoanalysis should force us to maintain 
obstinately, it's that the desire for knowledge bears no relation to knowledge 
unless, of course, we wheel out the lubricious word "transgression." A radical 
distinction , which has far-reaching consequences from the point of view of 
pedagogy - the desire to know is not what leads to knowledge. What leads to 
knowledge is - allow me to justify this in the more or less long term - the 
hysteric's discourse." (Lacan 1991: 23) 
s.s Lacap's discounes of the social bond 
We have noted that it is the student and ignorance which stands in extimite relation to the teacher; 
and we have also noted that it is the teacher and knowledge which stands in extimite relation to the 
student. This brings four categories in relation to each other: 'teacher', 'student', 'knowledge' and 
'ignorance'. We have also noted that the acquisition of the classification inaugurates the hysteric's 
discourse in the student. The hysteric's discourse is one of the four Lacanian discourses which we 
shall now integrate into this argument. My ideas in this regard are based on Lacan's discussion of 
the 'Production of the four discourses' (Lac an 1991: 11 - 26). 
Lacan's four discourses may be understood as four dimensions to the social bond in the pedagogic 
relation, which will be shown to be identifiable with the four elements ('actors') of pedagogic 
discourse: 'teacher', 'student', 'knowledge' and 'ignorance'. In formulating the social bonds, Lacan 
states that the hysteric's discourse in some way gives us the starting point to consider the other three 
(Lacan 1991: 14). However, in the order of his discussion of the discourses in his 17th seminar he 
takes as his starting point the discourse of the master (DM)23, because of the valency of the master to 







































































knowledge, which is shown below (Lacan 1991: 13): 
Thr~ alternative arrangements of this relation are obtained simply by rotating the matheme24, by a 




• the discourse of the hysteric, DH: 
• the discourse of the analyst, D A: 
• the discourse of the university, Du: 
5.6 The production of knowled&e 
Lacan's statement relating knowledge, desire and the hysteric's discourse may be interpreted in the 
following way. Lacan seems to allow us to speculate that there are two contexts for the acquisition of 
knowledge, each of which entailing its own configuration of the social bond. The first, when we 
"wheel out the lubricious word "transgression" ", occurs at the level of the university where new 
knowledge is forged out of hypotheses, theories and research. This is the level of the production of 
knowledge. This context of knowledge acquisition entails the performance of the discourse of the 
university. But, at its most authentic, it is not merely a performance within the realm of the possible, 
but an act which engages the impossible. It is an act which always has as its arena the limit of extant 
knowledge - the limit of the Law. It is a striving after knowledge purely for the sake of knowledge 
and as such, apropos Kant's categorical imperative, has the form of an ethical act (Zupancic 2000: 
85; Lacan 1981: 242; Davis 2005b: 2). It is because of the structure of the (ethical) academic act 
that it necessarily entails activity beyond the Law - a 'transgression' with respect to the boundaries 
of extant knowledge and beliefs. ZiZek says of the act: 
24 The four structures composed of 8., 82, a, and $ are mathemes, which is an example of Lacanian algebra. For a 































" . . . its performativity is "retroactive": it redefines the network of its own 
presuppositions. The "excess" of the act's retroactive performativity can also 
be formulated in terms of the Hegelian dialectics of Law and its transgression, 
Crime: from the perspective of the existing, positive Laws of a symbolic 
community, an act appears by definition as Crime, since it violates its 
symbolic limits and introduces an unheard-of element which turits everything 
topsy-turvy - there is neither rhyme nor reason in an act; an act is by its very 
nature scandalous ... " ( Zizek 1991: 192). 
This is the feel of the creation of new knowledge - a sense of trespassing onto forbidden territory 
because of the "retroactive performativity" which "redefines the network of its own 
presuppositions". New knowledge always has the effect of reorganising the field of knowledge. 
This also evinces the jouissance entailed in academic activity: a seemingly self-sustaining impetus 
toward the goal of acquiring new knowledge, yet finding the repetition of the activity itself to be the 
source of actual satisfaction. At this level, desire for knowledge inheres in the jouissance of 
academic practice. For it is precisely the path of jouissance, as an excess in desire, which leads 
beyond the pleasure principle (Lacan 1981: 31 ; Lacan 1986: 177). 
5.' The reproduction of knowledge 
The second context occurs at the level of the reproduction of knowledge, which may be seen at 
primary, secondary and undergraduate levels of education. This is the context familiar to all of us 
because it also occurs in the home as the primary socialisation of the subject. The motivation in this 
context is the approving gaze of the master, embodyhig and transmitting the desire of the master. It 
is summed up in Lacan's well-known axiom: " ... man's desire is the Other's desire" (Lacan 1981: 
38; Lacan 1999: 525). For it is under the master's gaze that the Subject acquires knowledge of what 
pleases the master. This discourse is none other than that between the Hegelian master and slave 
(Hegel 2008: §§ 189 - 190); Lacan 1991: 32). It is also Lacan's discourse of the hysteric, which 






















Starting with Bernstein, we have seen how the acquisition of the principles of classification 
produces the hysteric's discourse from within the pedagogic relation. Having seen the relation 
between Bernstein's theory and Lacan's discourses of the social bond, I would now like to produce 
the relations within these discourses which are descriptive of the pedagogic relation. 
5.8 Summary with a view to an answer to the Question 
I began this essay with a question about how best to teach a particular subject. We saw that this 
question entailed a consideration of the nature of the relation between the teacher and the student. 
We have referred to this relation as the pedagogic relation. The phenomenon of 'methods', 
'strategies', and 'theories of teaching' was invoked in this regard. Examples of approaches aimed at 
fleshing out the intricacies of the pedagogic relation were provided. These examples generally 
referenced the fields of sociology and anthropology. We raised two features with reference to these 
examples. 
First, that the imparting of knowledge implicates much more than a mere transmission of 
knowledge. Teachers employ 'strategies' in their attempt to get knowledge transmitted from the 
teacher and into the heads of students. The curriculum undergoes multiple transformations along its 
path from the teacher to the student, the last and arguably the most crucial, being the transformation 
in the student's mind. The practice, of teaching is always caught up in a necessity to get around an a 
priori condition of incomplete transmission-acquisition, which teachers seem to take into account in 
their engagement with students. The reader is reminded of the work of Alexander (2001) especially 
in this regard. 
The second feature raised in relation to the examples is that of the nature of the description of the 
pedagogic relation. In terms of Lacan's notions of the real, symbolic and imaginary orders, it was 
highlighted that we would want to avoid descriptions framed by the imaginary order in preference 
of descriptions framed by the symbolic order. A description framed by the symbolic order would 
allow for a structured conception of the pedagogic relation and hence permit us to draw out the 
principles which impart dynamism to the pedagogic relation. It was in terms of the real and the 
symbolic orders that we were able to produce an initial formulation of the pedagogic relation as 




















approach framed by the symbolic order. 
We therefore appealed to Bernstein's socio-linguistic theory of education because of its principled 
and highly structured approach to theorising educational transmissions. Bernstein's theory is 
explicitly framed by the symbolic order because of the author's structuralist approach to developing 
concepts and the network of their relations. In particular, we drew heavily upon his concept of 
pedagogic discourse, which is a conceptual component of the broader notion of the pedagogic 
device. References to resistance were also sought within Bernstein, and it is with respect to the 
feature of resistance in the pedagogic relation that we encountered the need to seek alternative 
descriptions to enable the development of our analysis. 
Concepts referring to investiture of symbolic power were shown to enhance our description of the 
pedagogic relation as structured around the affect of power on the emergence of resistance. It also, 
crucially, provided an alternative means of confirming the structural necessity of the resistance: the 
student qua bearer of ignorance reveals the limit of the teacher's power in pedagogic 
communication. We noted also that the notion of communication is itself a reference to its 
immanent failure. The limit to the teacher's power means that the aim of teaching, the reproduction 
of the privileged text, is arrested along the pathway to achieving its goal, binding the teacher to 
circulate the student's void of knowledge in a repetitive pedagogic drive. Herein lies the image of 
the teacher's impotence: that the delegated power to transmit knowledge is revealed, in a first 
instance, to be insufficient to ensure its acquisition and thereby sending off the teacher on a 
circuitous route to cover up the failures of pedagogic communication. Repetition is a necessary 
feature of education. 
This leads us into the description of the pedagogic relation in terms of the dynamics of the Lacanian 
discourses and antagonism. We need to map the relations of the original binary relation found in 
Bernstein - that of a transmitter and an acquirer - to the Lacanian discourses of the social bond. The 
work of mapping the structure of transmitter and acquirer onto the Lacanian discourses has already 
been accomplished and applied to analyses of the pedagogic relation (Davis 2005a; Davis 2004; 
Davis 2003; Davis 2002; and Samuels 2002). I will depend heavily upon these references for the 
ensuing discussion. It has also been noted with a detailed argument that "the different discursive 




















- in a manner that produces four intersubjective effects: educating, governing, desiring and 
analysing" (Davis 2003: 7). 
As we move into greater dependence on Lacanian notions it is worth bearing in mind his own 
positioning of psycho-analysis as a an intellectual field. His statement provides both a caution 
against 'reading too much into' his ideas as well as support for why the borrowing of his ideas is 
suitable for a discussion about the pedagogic relation, at the centre of which is the transference of 
knowledge, values and meanings: "Psycho-analysis is neither a Weltanschauung, nor a philosophy 
that claims to provide the key to the universe. It is governed by a particular aim, which is 
historically defmed by the elaboration of the notion of the subject. It poses this notion in a new way, 






















DYNAMICS OF THE PEDAGOGIC RELATION: AN ATTEMPTED DESCRIPTION 
6,1 MaPllin£ Bernstein onto Lacan 







= 8, =is 
~ 
:~ ~ ~ non-Student noll-Teacher 
Lacan's discourses of the social bond forms a morphologically similar structure which may be 
mapped onto our semiotic square for pedagogy that emerged out of Bernstein's initial uni-
directional model of transmission-acquisition. The reader is reminded that the pedagogic relation 
entails the relations of the teacher, the student, knowledge and resistance. Resistance functions as 
the absence of knowledge and so it may be represented as ignorance. The categories of the 





























(Illustration 10; A Mapping of the Pedagogic Relation - 2; Showing the Position of Objective Antagonism) 
Here we can see clearly that, in terms of the structure of the semiotic square, the antagonism is 
located in the encounter of knowledge and its absence (ignorance), the latter functioning as the real 
of the student which is resistant to the reproduction of the privileged text. Recalling that the bottom 
pair of categories are entailed in the upper pair of categories, we may also understand this schema 
as representing the extimite relation of antagonism to the pedagogic relation. 
The structure of Bernstein's transmission-acquisition model of pedagogic communication 
determines the position of the category 'teacher' in the top left-hand comer of the semiotic square. 
However, from our discussion on the acquisition of the Other's voice, the acquired classification 
leads to the student's interpellation and identification as a subject who does not know, or, a subject 
of ignorance. It is the quality of ignorance around which pedagogic praxis circulates: on one level 
as a quality of the student which must be displaced with knowledge; and on another level, as a 
quality of the teacher, as a reference, via negativa, to the potentiality of the reproduction of the 
privileged text. Schematically, this may be represented as the student addressing the teacher in 
search of the privileged text: 
Student - ... ~~ Teacher 




















It may, therefore, be argued that, if we are to represent the initial uni-directional relation of 
transmission-acquisition under the affect of identification, that we should swap the position of the 
student and teacher. We note that this exchange of positions in the schematic is necessitated by the 










allustration 12: Pedagogic Relation Structured by Recursion, Antagonism, and Identification) 
This transformation gives us a schema precisely equivalent in categories to the Lacanian discourse 
of the hysteric (DB), the argument for which I will provide below, following a brief comment on the 
nature of the student qua subject of ignorance. 
The status of the subject of ignorance has a curious quality: the lack constituting the subject of 
ignorance is precisely the locus of the object that will fill it. The student qua subject of ignorance 
sees himself as lacking the knowledge that the teacher wishes him to reproduce. It is this knowledge 
'if' rather than any other knowledge which is the object that holds out the potential of a dual fulfilment: 
~%~. i the displacement of ignorance in the subject of ignorance; as well as the offering of this same object 
'II to the teacher as that which will fulfil the desire of the teacher: the reproduction of the privileged 























6.2 The structure of the pedaaoldc relation; (DM (DB(Dhfr •• ) ••• ) ••• ) 
The mapping from Bernstein to Lacan, via the semiotic square, has now been accomplished. We 
now head towards the conclusion of this essay by picking up from the quaternary structures 
representing the discourses of the social bond (DM, DH, DA, Du), which I introduced in chapter 5. 
Davis (2003) argues that the mathemes for the discourses of the social bond have a basic structure, 
which he calls a "fundamental matrix" and which may be explicated in the following way: 
The factor in discourse 
which is most dominant 
The condition of possibility 
of the dominant factor 
(repressed) 
The Other activated 
by the dominant 
factor 
The product of 
interpellation 
(Illustration 13: The Fundamental Matrix of the Lacanian Social Bond, based on Davis 2003: 7) 
Davis's argument here is that the positions within each of the four discourses hold fixed meanings 
and that these meanings are to be read in relation to each other. The "fundamental matrix" provides 
a description of these meanings. 
As we have already seen, the mathemes of the social bond are obtained by a quarter-turn of the 







(Illustration 14: The Four Logical Instances of the Social Bond, based on Lacan 1991: 14) 



















Davis' interpretation of the fundamental matrix gives us a way of reading the meaning of each 
instance of the social bond. I will elaborate on two of these instances, which I see as being the most 
pertinent for the current essay. 
6.2.1 The Master's discourse WMl 
In the Master's discourse (DM), the master signifier (SI) is dominant. Lacan states that ''the very 
instant at which SI intervenes in the already constituted field of the other signifiers [S2], ... this 
$ ... the subject as divided, emerges" (Lacan 1991: 15). In other words, the master signifier 
reorganises the chain of existing signifiers as its general equivalent. This function of the master 
signifier is paralleled to the "articulation of the value-form" by Zizek (1991: 23 - 27, see also pp 7-
22). The Master's discourse is, therefore, a discourse which produces ''values'' and the effect of 
"governing" (Davis 2003: 7). In the Master's discourse we have the foregrounding of the law. We 
see in this a resonance with Bernstein's statement that the instructional discourse is embedded in a 
discourse of regulation, such that the latter discourse is ·dominant. In the first instance of pedagogy, 
it is regulation which establishes the pedagogic relation. And it is through regulation that the voice 
of the Other is transmitted. We note also that the product of the interpellation of the student is the 
production of object petit a, which here stands for that which escapes the law, that is, that which 
escapes pedagogic discourse, which is the resistant feature of ignorance entailed in the interpellation 
of the student. 
6.2.2 The Hysteric's discourse CPu) 
But the interpellation is never complete owing to the constitutive resistant feature of the pedagogic 
relation we have been referring to throughout this essay. We should take note of the assertion that 
the Lacanian subject is nothing but the failure of the Althusserian subject - its failure to be 
interpellated by the symbolic order (Zupancic 2000: 41n - 42n). This gets us onto the ground of the 
next logical instance of the social bond, because "hysteria is failed interpellation" (Ziiek 1991: 101). 
A quarter-tum of the Master's discourse produces the Hysteric's discourse (DR). In this discourse, 
the dominant factor is that of ''the subject as divided" ($), the salient factor is that of "alienation" 
and the effect is that of "desiring" (Davis 2003: 7). The alienation derives from the effect of the 




















ineffable and stupid existence" (8), becomes the subject of identification ($). In order to be 
assimilated into the symbolic order, the subject must become represented by a signifying chain in 
the symbolic order. In pedagogy, at the level of interactional practice, this signifying chain is the 
pedagogic discourse. This is accomplished by the subject forming an identification of himself in the 
symbolic when he responds to the hailing of pedagogic discourse. This is another way of expressing 
interpellation. But the result of being represented in the symbolic order in this way forces a split in 
which something of the original real subject is held on to as the response is made to the alienating 
call of the Other in pedagogic discourse. This fragment retained in identification is that part of the 
real subject which has effectively resisted interpellation. It represents the failure of pedagogic 
discourse and it may be represented by object petit a (or simply just 'a'). The process of alienation 
may thus be represented as: 
S~$+a 
(Illustration 15: The Process of Alienation in Identification) 
The subject is divided in its encounter with the pedagogic discourse, the bar in the Lacanian algebra 
representing this split that follows the encounter with the pedagogic discourse. The Master's 
discourse (DM) produced object petit a, which I said stands for the Other's jouissance. But this 
object, a, also stands for the that which remains of the subject in the split - a remainder of the failed 
interpellation. And this remainder is the subject's ignorance. One could think of it as the remainder 
of the pre-pedagogised, real subject, that part of the subject which escapes the governing effect of 
the pedagogic discourse. It is this part of the student qua Lacanian subject that we may designate as 
representing the nucleic resistance in the subject to knowledge, the 'subjectless knowledge' in the 
semiotic square. 
A discussion of the other two instances, those when 1 al and 187/ are in the dominant positions, will 
not be undertaken here, owing to the constraints of the essay as well as to the fact that we have 
reached a satisfactory level of interpreting Lacan's discourses for the purposes of answering my 
original question regarding the pedagogic relation. It would be suffice to refer the reader back to 
chapter 5 where a brief discussion of these instances of the discourse are provided. 



















Through the rule of evaluation, conscious substance is given to the immaterial (unconscious) form 
of this lack. In the praxis of teaching the teacher holds out the reproduction of the privileged text as 
the object (a) lacking in the student. The student identifies the object as object petit a (a1, 
constituting the lack in the teacher which the student then seeks to fill up through his 
productions/reproductions. We recall the L 8chema in this regard, in which the subject (8) identifies 
his image/ego (a1 in his objects (a), the objects being constituted in the desire of the Other (A), that 
is, as the Other's discourse, the Other's voice. We note also, while recalling the discussion on 
extimacy, that the evaluative rule may be perceived in Lacan's assertion that "the condition of the 
subject, 8 ... depends on what unfolds in the Other, N' (Lacan 1999: 458). 
6.2.3 The recursive dynamic in the peda&o&ic relation 
Implicated in the reproduction of the privileged text is the prior condition of its transmission and 
acquisition: the constitutive lack of the student. It is these two elements of ''text'' and "lack" which l is represented as the object a' seen from two different perspectives: from the teacher's perspective 
If the Other's gaze, and from the student's perspective as the subject's gaze. It is when they are 
gathered around this object (a1 that the teacher and student forms the pedagogic relation. It is this 
presence of a lack which necessitates pedagogic communication, as well as its failure when 
pedagogy runs up against the internal limits of communication. Pedagogic communication never 
really attains its goal of complete transmission-acquisition. The object (a 1 is therefore ever elusive 
as the student repetitively attempts to reproduce it and as the teacher repetitively attempts to refine 
the pedagogic communication. Davis goes on to state that "it is therefore a structural necessity that 
the hysteric always fails to complete the Other and in that way keep [ s] desire unsatisfied, refusing 
to be an object of the Other'sjouissance" (Davis 2003: 10, italics in original). 
It was noted that the failure of interpellation produces the object a which crops up as resistance to 
the pedagogic discourse. The resistance disrupts the intended smooth flow of transmission-
acquisition. In other words, the constellation of the symbolic order of pedagogic discourse (82) 
originally quilted by the intervention of the master signifier (8 1), is ruptured and threatened with an 
impending breakdown by the emergence of the resistant real of the student (object a). In order to 
suture the point of rupture in the symbolic order we require the function, yet again, of the master 
signifier, to restore the operation of the symbolic order of pedagogic discourse. This references the 



















necessity of a return to the Master's discourse as a direct consequence of its original intervention, 
illustrating the fact that resistance and antagonism are inherent in the constitution of the pedagogic 
relation, and structurally situated in the extimite relation of the teacher and the student. The 
alternating repetition of these instances of the Lacanian social bond, which I would like to designate 
with the signifier /(DM (DH(DM ... ) ... ) ... )/, is what animates pedagogic communication and what 






Bensusan and Shalem's (1994) discussion provides an alternative modality of the hysteric's 
discourse. In this modality, the teacher suspends the rules of evaluation. This is the Lacanian 
equivalent of suspending the effect of the master signifier - of governing - and purposefully 
inducing a destablising effect on the symbolic chain of pedagogic discourse. In this scenario the 
student is addressed by the jouissance of the teacher since it is the teacher's refusal to be 
interpellated that disrupts the symbolic order. This is the discourse of the analyst (D A), the salient 
factor being ''jouissance'' and the effect being that of "analysing" (Davis 2003: 7). This makes the 
pedagogic experience even more demanding on the student, since there is no privileged text to 
reproduce - the privileged text is that of authenticity: a re-valuation of the student's knowledge 
assumptions so that a shift in paradigm may be accomplished by the intervention a alternative 
master signifiers which emerge in the process of analysis. However, if the student fails to recognise 
that the process is one of analysis and not of governing, what results is the same response of the 
student as if the student assumes an expectation from the teacher to reproduce some privileged text. 
!: This response is the hysteric's discourse. It appears that whether the privileged text is made explicit 
i~ 
iii or not, the student's initial response to pedagogy is always that of the hysteric's discourse. This is so 
because it is the classification which interpellates the student as the subject of ignorance as a 
condition prior to any delivery of pedagogic content knowledge. The witholding of the knowledge 
object draws out the same query, "What do you want from me?", from the student. The principle at 
work here is clarified by the authors in their statement that ''pedagogy . .. functions by means of 




















desiring as such", which "entails a process which maintains the desire alive by constructing a chain 
of gratification which is continuously elusive so that the subject cannot come alongside it" 
(Bensusan and Shalem 1994: 181). A marker of this modality of the hysteric's discourse is that it 
does not lead to the supplementary question, "Why am I what you say I am?". The absolute 




















REFERENCES AND BlBUOGRAPBY 
Alexander, R. (2001). Culture and pedagogy: international comparisons in primary education. 
Massachusetts: Blackwell. 
Aoki, D.S. (2002). The Teacher Is A Prick. Chapter 3 in: Jagodzinsky, J. (ed.) (2002). Pedagogical 
Desire: Authority, Seduction, Transference, and the Question of Ethics. Connecticut: 
Bergin & Garvey. 
Bailly, L. (2009). Lacan. Oxford: Oneworld. 
Bernstein, B. (2000). Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique 
(Revised edition). Maryland, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Bernstein, B. (1994). Discourses, Knowledge Structures and Fields: paper presented at the 
Bernstein Seminars, Session 1 on Thesday, 1 st November 1994. University of Cape Town. 
Bernstein, B. (1990). The Structuring of Pedagogic Discourse. Class, Codes & Control Volume IV. 
pp. 165 - 218. London: Routledge. 
Bernstein, B. (1981). Codes, Modalities, and the Process of Cultural Reproduction: A Model. 
In Language in Society, Vol. 10, No.3 (Dec., 1981), pp. 327-363. 
United States of America: Cambridge University Press. 
Bernstein, B. (1975). Primary Socialization, Language and Education. Class, Codes and Control 
Volume 3: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions, 2nd edition. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Bernstein, B. (1971). Class, Codes and Control Volume I: Theoretical Studies Towards a 
Sociology of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 



















l.:....... Bernstein, B. (1964). Elaborated and Restricted Codes: Their Social Origins and Some 
~ Consequences. In: American Anthropologist, New Series, Volume 66, No.6, Part 2: The 
~t;-· 
Ethnography of Communication pp. 55 - 69. USA: American Anthropological Association. 
Bourdieu, P. (1992). Language and Symbolic Power. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Chitsike, M.J. (2011). An investigation of the co-constitution of mathematics and learner 
identification in the pedagogic situations of schooling, with special reference to the 
teaching and learning of mathematics in a selection of grade 10 mathematics lessons at 
five schools in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. Masters Dissertation, University 
of Cape Town. Cape Town: UCT Press. 
Chandler, D. (2003). Semiotics for Beginners: Paradigmatic Analysis. Last update: Mon, 17 March 
2003. Online: 26 September 2007, http://www.aber.ac.ukLmedia/DocumentsJS4B/sem05.html 
Daniels, H. (2001). Bernstein and Activity Theory. In: Morais, A. et. al. (eds.). Towards and 
Sociology of Pedagogy. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. 
Davies, B. (2007). Why Bernstein? Paper presented to the Colloque enjeux sociaux, savoirs, 
langage, pedagogie. Actualite et fecondite de I' reuvre de Basil Bernstein, Lyon, 31 May 
2007. Mimeograph. 
Davis, Z. (2005a). Pleasure and Pedagogic Discouse in School Mathematics: A Case Study of a 
Problem-Centred Pedagogic Modality. PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town. Cape Town: 
UCTPress. 
Davis, Z. (2oo5b). Bernstein's discursive gap and the Kantian antinomies of reason. August 2005, 
School of Education, University of Cape Town. Mimeograph. 
Davis, Z. (2004). The Debt to Pleasure. In: Muller, J., Davis, B., and Morais, A. (eds.) Reading 

















































Davis, Z. (2003). Bernstein avec Lacan: Desire, Jouissance & Pedagogic Discourse. In: Trueit, D. et 
al. (eds.) Internationalization of Curriculum Studies. New York: Peter Lang. 
Davis, Z. (2002). The Subject and Knowledge in Pedagogic Discourse. Paper presented to the 2nd 
International Bernstein Symposium, Breakwater Lodge, UCT, 17th - 19th July. 
Dowling, P. & Brown, A. (2007). Pedagogy and community. Chapter 7 in: Dowling, P. (2009). 
Sociology as method: departures from the forensics of culture, text and knowledge. 
Rotterdam: Sense publishers 
Durkheim, E. (1982). The Rules of Sociological Method. London: Macmillan. 
Durkheim, E. (1961). Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of 
Education. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 
Engestrom, Y. & Miettinen, R. (1999). Introduction: activity theory: a well-kept secret in 
Engestrom, Y., Miettinen, R. and Punamaki R-L. (eds.) Perspectives on activity theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Evans, D. (2006). An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Gray, E.M. & Tall, D.O. (1994). Duality, Ambiguity, and Flexibility: A "Proceptual" View of 
Simple Arithmetic. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 25 (2), pp. 116 - 140. 
Greimas, A.J., Perron, P., & Collins, F. (1989). On Meaning. New Literary History, 20(3), 
'Gremasian Semiotics'. pp. 539 - 550. John Hopkins University Press. 
Greimas, A.J. & Rastier, F. (1968). The interaction of semiotic constraints. Yale French Studies, 41, 
'Game, Play, Literature', pp. 86 - 105. Yale University Press. 



















Hegel, G.W.P' (2008). System of Science. First part: The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 
Trans: Pinkard, T. (2008). 
[Online 26 July 2009: http://web.mac.comltitpaullSitelPhenomenology _oCSpiricpage.html] 
Holland, J. (1981). Social class and changes in orientations to meanings. Sociology 15(1): 1 - 18. 
i Katilius-Boydstun, M. (1990). The semiotics of A.J. Greimas: An introduction. Klimas, A. (ed.) 





[Online: 26th July 2010 http://www.lituanus.or.v19903/90302.htm] 
Lacan, J. (1999). Ecrits. Paris: Editions du Seuil. [English publication: Fink, B. in collaboration 
with Fink, H. and Grigg, R. (2006). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.] 
Lacan, J. (1991). Le Seminair de Jacques Lacan, Livre XVII L'Envers de la Psychoanalyse, 1969-
1970. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Translated by Grigg, R. (2007). [English publication: 
Miller, J-A (ed.) (2007). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XVII: The Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.] 
Lacan, J. (1981). The Seminar of Jacque Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Lacan, J. (1986). Le Seminaire, Livre VII: L'ethique de la psychanalyse 1959 -1960, edited by 
Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Le Editions du Seuil. [English translation: Porter, D. (1992). 
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan 1959 - 1960: Book VII. 
London: Routledge.] 
Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical democratic 
politics. London: Verso. 




















Kaptelinin, V. & Nardi, B. (2006). Activity theory in a nutshell. In: Kaptelinin, V. & Nardi, B. (eds.) 
Acting with technology: Activity Theory and interaction design. Massachusetts: MIT press. 
Kaptelinin, v., Nardi, B., & Macaulay, C. (1999). Methods and tools: The activity checklist: a tool 
for representing the "space" of context. Interactions 6(4), pp. 27 - 39. New York: ACM Press. 
Kozulin, A. (2003). Psychological tools and mediated learning. In: Kozulin, A., Gindis, B. Ageyev, 
V.V., & Miller, S.M., JYgotsky's educational theory in cultural context. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Miller, J-A. (1994). Extimite. Chapter 3 In: Bracher, M. et. al.(eds.) Lacanian Theory of Discourse: 
Subject, Structure & Society. New York: New York University Press. 
Pane, D.M. (20lO). Viewing classroom discipline as negotiable social interaction: A communities of 
practice perspective. In: Teaching and Teacher Education (26), 87 - 97. Online publication: 
Elsevier electronic journals at www.elsevier.comllocateltate 
Samuels, R. (2002). Being Outside the Circle: Postmodem Composition, Pedagogy, and 
Psychoanalytic Theory. Chapter 4 in: Jagodzinsky, J. (ed.) (2002). Pedagogical 
Desire: Authority, Seduction, Transference, and the Question of Ethics. Connecticut: Bergin & 
Garvey. 
Silverman, K. (1983). The Subject of Semiotics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
ZiZek, S. (1991). For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. London: Verso. 
Zupancic, A. (2003). Ethics and Tragedy in Lacan. In: Rabate, Jean-Michel (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan, pp.174 -190. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zupancic, A. (2000). Ethics of the real: Kant, Lacan. London: Verso. 
790f79 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
\ 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
